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Abstract
We develop a model of bailout stigma where accepting a bailout signals a firm’s
balance-sheet weakness and worsens its funding prospect. To avoid stigma, a firm with
high-quality legacy assets either withdraws from subsequent financing after receiving a
bailout or refuses a bailout altogether to send a favorable signal. The former leads to a
short-lived stimulation with subsequent market freeze even worse than if there were no
bailout. The latter revives the funding market, albeit with delay, to the level achievable
without any stigma. Strikingly, a bailout offer is most effective when many firms reject
it (to build a favorable reputation) rather than accept it.
Keywords: Adverse selection, bailout stigma, secret bailout
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1 Introduction
History is fraught with financial crises and large-scale government interventions, the latter
often involving a highly visible and significant wealth transfer from taxpayers to banks and
their creditors. According to an IMF estimate based on 124 systemic banking crises from
around the world during the period 1970-2007, the average fiscal costs associated with crisis
management were around 13 percent of GDP (Laeven and Valencia, 2008). More recently,
during the 2007-2009 Great Recession, the US government paid $125 billion for assets worth
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$86-109 billion to the nine largest banks under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP)
(Veronesi and Zingales, 2010).1 At the time of writing this paper, an unprecedented scale
of bailouts is being organized to meet the challenges of the unfolding COVID-19 crisis. The
benefits of such interventions are difficult to measure since they depend on the unobservable
counterfactual that would have played out in the absence of such interventions.
Philippon and Skreta (2012) and Tirole (2012) develop a plausible counterfactual of a
market freeze and a rationale for how government interventions may improve welfare. The
essence of the argument is that the government can jump-start a market that would otherwise
freeze due to adverse selection. By cleaning up bad assets, or “dregs skimming,” through public
bailouts, the government can improve market confidence, thereby galvanizing transactions in
healthier assets. However, the flip side of such dregs-skimming is that bailouts can attach
stigma to their recipients, and thus increase future borrowing costs. The fear of this stigma
may in turn discourage financially distressed firms from accepting bailout offers in the first
place.
Policy makers during the Great Recession were well aware of such a fear and took efforts
to alleviate the stigma. At the now-famous meeting held on October 13, 2008, Henry Paulson,
then Secretary of the Treasury, “compelled” the CEOs of the nine largest banks to be the
initial participants in the TARP, precisely to eliminate the stigma (“Eight days: the battle to
save the American financial system,” The New Yorker, September 21, 2009). The rates at the
Fed’s discount window, usually set above the federal funds rate, were cut half a percentage
point to counteract the stigma that using the window would signal distress (Geithner, 2015,
p. 129).2
Despite these efforts, the stigma remained real and significant. Armantier et al. (2015)
documented that the banks were willing to pay 44 basis points (bps) more for borrowing
from the Term Auction Facility (TAF) than they would pay for using the discount window.
Gauthier et al. (2015) further demonstrate that the banks that accessed the TAF in 2008
paid approximately 31 bps less in interbank lending in 2010 than those that used the discount
window. Given that the TAF was designed to hide the identities of its users, a possible expla-
nation is that banks wanted to avoid stigma attached to using the discount window. There are
also anecdotes highlighting the presence of stigma. Ford refused rescue loans under the Auto
1Congressional Budget Office (2012) estimates the overall cost of the TARP at approximately $32 billion,
the largest part of which stems from assistance to AIG and the automotive industry while capital injections to
financial institutions are estimated to have yielded a net gain. For detailed assessments of the various programs
in the TARP, see the Journal of Economic Perspectives (2015). See also Fleming (2012) who discusses how
the various emergency liquidity facilities provided by the Federal Reserve during the 2007-2009 crisis were
designed to overcome the limitations of traditional policy instruments at the time of crisis. Tong and Wei
(2020) provide international evidence on the effect of unconventional interventions during 2008-2010.
2Such a concern is echoed in a speech given by the former Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke in 2009:
“The banks’ concern was that their recourse to the discount window, if it became known, might lead market
participants to infer weakness—the so-called stigma problem.”
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Industry Program in the TARP, with a view to “legitimately portraying itself as the health-
iest of Detroit’s automakers” (“A risk for Ford in shunning bailout, and possibly a reward,”
The New York Times, December 19, 2008).3 Such reluctance to receive government offers of
recapitalization was also noted during the Japanese banking crisis of the 1990s (Corbett and
Mitchell, 2000; Hoshi and Kashyap, 2010). While differing in nature, a similar concern about
bailout stigma is expressed in the wake of the current COVID-19 crisis (“Bernanke and Yellen,
the Federal Reserve must reduce long-term damage from coronavirus,” The Financial Times,
March 23, 2020).
Examples such as the above raise questions about whether public bailouts are effective
and, if so, how they should be designed in light of the associated stigma. We address these
questions by analyzing a two-period model of bailouts that can address reputational concerns
most parsimoniously. There is a continuum of firms, each with one unit of a legacy asset in
each period. The quality of asset in both periods is identical for each firm and is its private
information unobserved by other parties. In each period, firms have access to profitable
investment opportunities. However, the liquidity constraint and the lack of pledgeability of
projects imply that firms need to sell assets in the market to fund those projects. As in Tirole
(2012), we focus on the case where adverse selection leads to a market freeze and calls for a
public bailout. To understand the reputational consequence of accepting a bailout, we assume
the government runs a bailout program in the first period only, and firms must sell their
assets in the market to fund their projects in the second period (as well as in the first period).
The sale of assets in the market is not publicly observed, but firms’ acceptance of the bailout
offer is. The market updates its belief on the quality of assets based on the observation of
firms’ decisions on asset sale made in the first period, and thus makes its second-period offer
accordingly.
Bailout stigma is captured in our model by the worsenened terms that bailout recipients
face for the sale of their assets in the second period. As shown by Philippon and Skreta (2012)
and Tirole (2012), a key function of public bailouts is dregs-skimming: by taking out the
left tail of the worst quality assets, the bailout improves the perceived quality of remaining
3The market initially perceived Ford’s refusal to accept a bailout as a risky move, which was re-
flected in the rise in Ford’s CDS spreads relative to Chrysler’s. However, Ford’s profit and stock
price showed a remarkable turnaround in 2009, part of which is attributed to the respect Ford
garnered with customers and investors by refusing a bailout. (http://www.nasdaq.com/investing/
ford-turns-a-profit-after-turning-down-bailout.aspx, accessed Nov 17, 2015). In a similar vein, par-
ticipants in the TARP were eager to exit the program early, often citing stigma as their main motivation.
Signature Bank of New York was one of the first to repay its TARP debt of $120 million for this reason. Its
chairman, Scott A. Shay, said, “We don’t want to be touched by the stigma attached to firms that had taken
money.” (“Four small banks are the first to pay back TARP funds,” The New York Times, April 1, 2009). It
is also well known that Jamie Dimon, CEO of JP Morgan Chase, wanted to exit TARP to avoid the stigma
(“Dimon says he’s eager to repay ‘Scarlet Letter’ TARP,” Bloomberg, April 16, 2009). Of course, the fear of
stigma is not the only reason for an early exit. Wilson and Wu (2012) find that early exit by banks is also
related to CEO pay, bank size, capital, and other financial conditions.
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assets, thereby rejuvenating asset trade in the market. But the dregs-skimming through
bailouts implies that the market is more likely to believe those that accept the bailout to be
less investment-worthy than those that refuse the bailout. Such a belief is reflected in the
differential treatment of the two groups of firms in the second period: the market’s offer to
bailout recipients would be in general in worse terms than that to the bailout holdouts.
The precise mechanism of how the bailout stigma affects the efficacy of the bailout cru-
cially depends on firms’ strategic responses to the bailout offer. We identify two equilibrium
outcomes—short-lived stimulation and delayed stimulation.
A short-lived stimulation equilibrium arises when high-quality firms strategically avoid
the bailout stigma by accepting a bailout in the first period but boycotting the market in
the second period. Since bailout recipients with high-quality assets are more likely to boycott
the market (which is a consequence of the usual single-crossing property), those that accept
a bailout but are compelled to participate in the second period market suffer a severe stigma.
This makes low-quality firms reluctant to accept a bailout, forcing them to sell their assets to
the market instead at a discounted price to avoid the stigma. In the end, however, no arbitrage
between selling to the government and selling to the market means that market sellers must
also suffer a corresponding level of haircut. Effectively, the bailout stigma “spreads” from
bailout recipients to market sellers. In turn, this contagion of stigma leads firms with high-
quality assets to avoid selling to the market, opting instead to accept bailout offers while
boycotting the second-period market altogether to avoid the stigma. Finally, their withdrawal
from the second-period market inflicts a severe stigma on those firms (with low-quality assets)
that must participate in that market, thus completing the feedback loop.
The presence of firms that accept a bailout but boycott the subsequent market thwarts the
dregs-skimming role of bailouts and undermines the overall effectiveness of bailouts. Not only
do these firms withdraw from the second-period market, but their withdrawal also exacerbates
the stigma for those participating in the second-period market with a devastating consequence:
the market freeze is even worse than if there were no bailout! However, this does not necessarily
mean that a bailout has no effect; it stimulates asset trade in the first period, and this effect
may outweigh the dampening effect in the second period. Nevertheless, stimulation will be
short-lived in this equilibrium. We show that the policy maker can avoid this equilibrium by
offering sufficiently generous bailout terms—i.e., high purchase prices for assets, in which case
the stigma will manifest itself in a different form: “delayed stimulation.”
A delayed stimulation equilibrium arises when high-quality firms refuse to sell either to
the government or to the market in first period. They do so to build a good reputation on
their assets so that they can sell their assets in the second period at favorable terms. This
equilibrium is possible when the bailout offer is generous enough to attract a large fraction of
firms with lower-quality assets. This allows firms to send a credible signal about their asset
quality when they refuse the bailout offer. Buyers will then respond with a very attractive
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price offer in the second period—one that makes it worthwhile for high-quality firms to forego
asset sale in the first period. In sum, the equilibrium endogenously creates an opportunity
for high-quality firms to signal their financial strength by rejecting the government’s generous
offer.
Such a favorable signaling opportunity offsets the adverse effect of bailout stigma, even
though market rejuvenation is delayed to the second period. The presence of firms rejecting a
bailout means that the volume of asset trade is lower in the first period than in the one-period
benchmark with the same bailout offer. In an extreme case, it is even possible that the bailout
has no stimulation effect in the first period relative to the laissez-faire economy. Such an initial
lack of response may be seen as a policy failure. However, the policy is “quietly” strengthening
the confidence (in the refusing firms) and bears dividend in the second period. In fact, the
overall trade volume is higher than in a short-lived stimulation equilibrium; remarkably, it is
the same as if there were no bailout stigma—that is, if the identities of bailout recipients were
concealed successfully, which is often difficult to achieve in practice. Except for the delay,
rejection of bailouts by high-quality firms could very well be a blessing in disguise.
The conclusion that the policy maker may wish to offer a generous bailout term to induce
a delayed stimulation equilibrium is further reinforced once the costs of bailouts are taken
into account. Even though the bailout term required for a short-lived stimulation equilibrium
is more modest, the policy ends up being costly since it induces high-type firms which would
not otherwise require a bailout to accept a bailout at terms that would compensate their
stigma. For this reason, the delayed stimulation equilibrium, if it can be induced, achieves the
same stimulation effect as short-lived stimulation equilibrium at a lower cost. Our theory thus
recognizes the need for bailout terms to be sufficiently generous to yield a tangible benefit.
This implication, although departing from the classical Bagehot’s rule,4 is consistent with the
approach taken by the policy makers in the Great Recession.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our model while
Section 3 analyses several benchmark cases. In Section 4, we study various equilibria under
government intervention. Section 5 provides the welfare analysis of bailout policy. Section 6
discusses related literature. Section 7 concludes. Proofs not contained in the main text are
deferred to Appendix A and Online appendix.
4Bagehot’s rule, orginating from the 1873 book, Lombard Street, by William Bagehot, prescribes that
central banks should charge a higher rate than the markets to discourage banks from borrowing once the crisis
subsides. Bailout stigma was not a serious issue in 1873, however, since the regulatory system in 1873 Britain
ensured concealment of the identities of emergency borrowers, as Gorton (2015) points out.
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2 Model
We adopt a model that extends Tirole (2012) to a setup which admits a bailout stigma. There
is a continuum of firms each endowed with two units of legacy assets with the same value; one
unit of the asset becomes available in each of two periods (t = 1, 2) for possible sale.5 The
asset value θ of each firm is privately known to that firm and distributed on [0, 1] according
to cdf F with density f . For convenience, we hereafter call a firm with legacy asset θ a type-θ
firm. Throughout, we assume that f is log-concave, i.e., d2 log f(θ)/dθ2 < 0. Log-concavity
of f implies intuitive properities we shall use on truncated conditional expectation: for any
0 < a < b < 1, 0 < ∂
∂a
E[θ|a ≤ θ ≤ b], ∂
∂b
E[θ|a ≤ θ ≤ b] < 1 (see Bagnoli and Bergstrom
(2005)). We additionally assume that for each b ∈ (0, 1], 2E[θ|a < θ < b] − E[θ|θ ≤ a]
is increasing in a for any a ∈ (0, b). These properties, which hold for many well-known
distributions, facilitate the characterization of our equilibria.
In each period, an investment project becomes available to each firm. The project is
socially valuable with net return S > 0 but requires funding of I > 0. The firm can finance
the project by selling its legacy asset each period. As we will see, the outcome from this
laissez-faire regime will typically be inefficient due to the adverse selection associated with
uncertain asset value. This inefficiency rationalizes a government bailout in the form of an
offer to purchase legacy assets at some price pg. The timeline of our full game is depicted in
Figure 1:
t = 1
t = 2
Firms privately
learn the value of
their legacy assets.
Government offers
to buy one unit of
the asset at pg .
Buyers in the market
make offers.
Firms accept either a
government offer, a
market offer, or none.
Those who sell fund
the project.
Buyers make offers
for t = 2 legacy as-
sets.
Firms either sell to
the buyers or hold
out. Those who sell
fund their projects.
Project returns for
both periods are real-
ized.
Figure 1 – Timeline for the two-period model
To focus our attention on the main issue—namely, bailout stigma—we make several sim-
plifying assumptions.
5One can think of the assets as account receivable or the contract for (securitized) assets to be delivered
over two periods.
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First, just like Tirole (2012), we assume that the limited pledgeability of the project inhibits
direct financing. This means that the sale of legacy assets is the only means of funding the
project for firms. In the same vein, we consider the government’s purchase of legacy assets as
the only means of government bailout. This is primarily a simplifying assumption. As shown
by Philippon and Skreta (2012), the main thrust of the analysis extends to the case in which
the project can be pledged along with legacy assets as collateral to obtain financing.6
Second, project returns are realized at the end of t = 2, so it is impossible to use the
return from t = 1 project to finance the t = 2 project. This assumption is made primarily
to simplify the analysis but is well justified in many settings in which there are differences
between accrual and realization of cash flows.7 That is, we consider the case where the project
return accrues each period if it is funded but the final cash flow realizes in t = 2.
Third, as is standard in the literature, we assume that asset buyers are competitive and
make purchase offers in Bertrand fashion. We assume that, in the event of an indifference,
a buyer breaks a tie in favor of buying an asset rather than not buying.8 Buyers live for
one period and make offers that would break even in expectation. Importantly, the buyers in
t = 2 can make rational inference about firms’ types from their observable behavior in t = 1,
in particular with their acceptance/rejection of a bailout offer.
Fourth, we assume that the sale of assets to the market in t = 1 is private and therefore not
revealed to buyers in t = 2. This implies that buyers in the t = 2 market cannot distinguish
between those that sold in the t = 1 market and those that did not. Again the primary reason
for this assumption is to simplify the analysis by shutting off channels of dynamic information
revelation. But this assumption is well justified given that many important financial and real
assets are sold privately over the counter. The main thrust of our results extends to the case
of observable sale, as shown by the working paper version of our paper (see Che, Choe and
Rhee (2018).) Further, this assumption makes a comparison with Tirole (2012) transparent,
thus helping to isolate the effect of stigma.
Fifth, a government bailout is available only in the first period. This is consistent with
the observed practice: governments refrain from engaging in long-term bailouts and from
complete “nationalization” of distressed firms (which would be equivalent to purchasing two
units of the asset in our model). Further, our goal is to study the reputational consequence
of accepting a bailout, which can be studied most effectively when no bailout is available in
6Their insight appears to apply to our context, which suggests that debt contracts would be optimal in our
context as well. Since the stigma issue is separable from the issue of contract form, we abstract from it in the
current paper.
7If a project return from t = 1 can be used to fund the project in t = 2, then this will affect the amount
of funding each firm demands based on the successful funding in the first period. This complicates analysis
in a way that does not add any obvious new insight to our central theme. In particular, bailout stigma will
remain relevant as long as the funding need is not fully met by the cash flow generated by an early project.
8This tie-breaking assumption is largely to simplify analysis and exposition. It has no material effect on
the substantive results obtained in the paper.
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the second period.
Last, we focus on “transparent” bailouts; namely, the t = 2 market observes which firms
have accepted the bailout. Not only do transparent bailouts highlight the stigma effect most
clearly, but they are also important from a practical perspective. While secret bailouts may
address the stigma problem, secrecy is often difficult to achieve in practice.
3 Preliminary Analysis
Before proceeding, we study several benchmarks. They will facilitate comparison with, and
provide a context for, our main results, which will follow in Section 4.
3.1 Laissez Faire without Government Bailout
We first consider the benchmark without a bailout. The timeline is the same as Figure 1,
except that the government’s bailout is absent. Since the sale of the assets is private and
not publicly revealed, there is no linkage between the market outcomes across two periods.
Thus, the game reduces to a one-period game (repeated twice) whose equilibrium coincides
with that of Tirole’s game without bailout.
Fix any period. The market equilibrium is understood best as a form of Akerlof’s lemons
problem, which is depicted in Figure 2.
0 Quantity
Price
Average Benefit
Curve (E[θ|θ ≤ x])
Supply Curve
(θ − S)
θ0
p0
Marginal Benefit
Curve
−S
Figure 2 – Determination of the cutoff type θ0 in the laissez-faire economy
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A type-θ firm benefits p + S from selling a unit of asset at price p if p ≥ I, but loses its
asset value θ. Hence, the firm sells asset if and only if θ < p + S, as described by the supply
curve in the figure. Meanwhile, the buyer of the asset realizes its value θ minus price p. Since
if type-θ firm sells, then type θ′-firm with θ′ < θ strictly prefers to sell—a property known as
“single-crossing”—the buyer’s perceived value is given by the average benefit E[θ|θ ≤ x], as
depicted in the figure, if the higest type selling is x.
The equilibrium is then characterized by the intersection of the supply and average benefit
curves, namely by a cutoff θ0 such that:
θ0 − S = E[θ|θ ≤ θ0] =: p0. (1)
First, buyers must break even, so the equilibrium price must be p0 = E[θ|θ ≤ θ0], the
average value of the asset, and this price must be at least I (or else trading would not occur).
Next, the threshold type θ0 must find the price p at least worth the opportunity cost of sale
θ0−S (depicted by Figure 2). Given the log-concavity assumption, there is a unique threshold
θ0 satisfying the requirements.
9
Figure 3 summarizes the equilibrium configuration.10
θ0 = p0 + S
t = 1
the worst type the best type
t = 2
p0 = E[θ|θ ≤ θ0]
Figure 3 – No bailout equilibrium
Adverse selection means that the above outcome is typically inefficient. Specifically, if
S < 1 − E[θ], then θ0 < 1, so not all firms sell and finance their projects. It is also possible
for θ0 = 0, in which case the market freezes completely. To focus on the nontrivial case, we
assume θ0 < 1. For expositional ease, it is also convenient to focus on the partial freeze case
(θ0 > 0) in what follows. We will discuss the full freeze case (θ0 = 0) later in Remark 2.
Example 1. Consider the uniform case, i.e., F (θ) = θ. In this case, the equilibrium price
p0 is determined by p0 = E[θ|θ ≤ θ0] = θ02 . Suppose θ0 ∈ (0, 1). Then, from the indifference
9It is routine to check that if f is log-concave (∂
2 log f(θ)
∂θ2 < 0 for all θ), then there is a unique θ satisfying
(1); see Tirole (2012).
10As mentioned, buyers cannot update their information since the market transactions are private. If market
transactions were observable, then trading decisions become dynamic, which makes analysis complicated; see
Che, Choe and Rhee (2018).
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condition θ0 = p0 + S =
θ0
2
+ S, the cutoff type θ0 is uniquely determined as θ0 = 2S, and
p0 = S, if S ∈ [I, 1/2). If S < I, then the equilibrium price p0 = S cannot fund the project,
so the market fully freezes, and hence θ0 = 0. If S ≥ 1−E[θ] = 1/2, then θ ≤ E[θ] +S for all
θ ∈ [0, 1], and therefore, θ0 = 1.
3.2 Bailout without Stigma: One-Period Model
We next consider another benchmark, the one-period bailout model by Tirole (2012) in which
the government offers to purchase assets at price pg above the laissez-faire price p0 before the
market opens. Specfically, the timeline simply comprises t = 1 in Figure 1.11 Since there is no
consequence of accepting a bailout from the government in this one-period model, there is no
bailout stigma—at least in the sense we will capture in our two-period model later.12 Thus,
this benchmark will help to identify the role of bailout stigma later in our main analysis.
A Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, or called simply an equilibrium from now on, of this game
is characterized as follows. Let µg and µm denote the fractions of types θ ≤ pg +S that sell to
the government and to the market, respectively, where µg + µm = 1. We can first argue that
µg > 0. If no firm accepts the government offer, then the laissez-faire equilibrium will prevail,
with marginal type θ0 and equilibrium price p0 = E[θ|θ < θ0]. Since pg > p0, however, firms
will deviate to accept the government offer, a contradiction.
Next, suppose µm > 0, so the market is active in equilibrium.
13 Then, the market price
pm must equal the government price pg, or else a lower offer will not be accepted. Given this,
firms must sell (either to the government or to the market) if and only if θ < pg+S. Let θg and
θm denote the average values of assets sold to the government and the market, respectively
(θm can be arbitrary in case µm = 0). Clearly, we must have
µgθg + µmθm = E[θ|θ ≤ pg + S]. (2)
Further, since the market buyers must break even in case µm > 0, we have pm = θm. Given
11An astute reader will notice that this timeline differs slightly from that considered by Tirole (2012),
where the market opens after firms have decided on the government offer. We adopt the current timeline
since it is arguably more realistic, and also it permits equilibrium existence more broadly for our two-period
extension. For the one-period version, the difference is immaterial, since the equilibrium under the current
timeline is payoff-equivalent to Tirole’s equilibrium for all players involved. In addition, we do not invoke an
equilibrium refinement adopted in Tirole (2012), as the central feature of the equilibrium holds irrespective of
the refinement. See Remark 1.
12Note Tirole (2012) and Philippon and Skreta (2012) do recognize “stigma” associated with the types of
firms that accept a bailout, but they do not study its effect on the subsequent game as well as on the initial
decision to accept the bailout, the dual focuses of the current paper.
13Under our timeline, the market may not be active in equilibrium. To see how such an equilibrium can
be supported, suppose a buyer deviates and offers a price p′ > pg. Since firms have not yet accepted the
government offer by then (given our timeline), all types θ < p′ would accept the deviation offer, and the
deviating buyer will suffer a loss since p′ > pg > p0.
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pg = pm, this in turn implies θm = pg.
The central feature of the Tirole (2012) follows from these observations:
Theorem 1 (dregs-skimming).
(i) In any equilibrium of the one-period benchmark with government offer pg > max{p0, I},
firms sell assets (either to the government or to the market) at price pg if and only if
θ < pg+S. Since pg > p0, more firms finance their projects than without the government
intervention.
(ii) If µm > 0 so that the market is active, then we must have θg < θm; i.e., on average lower
value assets are sold to the government than to the market.
Proof. We have already established (i). To prove (ii), suppose to the contrary θm ≤ θg.
Then, by (2), θm ≤ E[θ|θ ≤ pg + S]. Since θm = pg, we have pg ≤ E[θ|θ ≤ pg + S], or
pg + S ≤ E[θ|θ ≤ pg + S] + S. By the definition of θ0, pg + S ≤ θ0 = p0 + S, which
contradicts pg > p0. The remaining characterizations follow from the observations preceding
the theorem. Q.E.D.
Figure 4 illustrates the outcomes with and without government bailout. By offering a
higher price pg than the laissez-faire price p0, the government does indeed take out relatively
low-value assets, which in turn improves the perception of the assets sold to the market and
thus alleviates adverse selection.
θ0
θˆg = pg + Sthe worst type the best type
Equilibrium without bailout
Equilibrium with bailout
Note: the types selling to a market is depicted by blue and the types selling to the government
is depicted by red.
Figure 4 – Effects of bailout in the one-period benchmark
More importantly for our purpose, assets are sold to the government at the same price as
they are sold to the market. This reflects the absence of stigma associated with accepting a
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bailout. Plainly, in the one-period problem, firms that accept the bailout do not have any
consequences to worry about simply because the game ends after the bailout.
Remark 1 (The role of the equilibrium refinement in Tirole (2012)). To obtain the “dregs-
skimming” role of bailout, Tirole (2012) invokes an equilibrium refinement—that the market
sale collapses with an arbitrarily small probability. This refinement “forces” the equilibrium
to have the dregs-skimming feature, since it implies single-crossing: namely, there exists θ˜ ∈
(0, pg + S) such that types θ ≤ θ˜ all sell to the government and types θ ∈ (θ˜, pg + S] all sell
to the market.14 However, this refinement obfuscates the source of dregs-skimming: namely,
whether it is an artifact of the refinement or something more fundamental. Without invoking
that refinement, Theorem 1 proves that dregs-skimming is fundamental (and not driven by
the refinement). Without the refinement, however, there are multiple equilibria that differ in
terms of µg and the value θg, but every such equilibrium exhibits the “dregs-skimming” feature.
3.3 Secret Bailouts
In order to identify the effects of bailout stigma, we need to understand what happens if the
policy maker can eliminate the stigma altogether. Imagine that the policy maker “completely
and successfully” conceals the identities of the firms that accept the government offer. This
kind of secrecy has been an important part of the bailout policy, precisely because of the stigma
issue.15 In this sense, secret bailouts are worth studying in their own right. Nevertheless, we
primarily regard secrecy as a benchmark against which transparent bailouts are compared,
given our premise that “complete” secrecy has been so far difficult to achieve despite many
concerted efforts.16
The equilibrium under complete secrecy is very easy to analyze. Since neither selling to the
14Suppose a market sale is subject to probability  > 0 of cancellation. If a type-θ firm prefers to sell to the
government, then pg + S ≥ (1− )(pm + S) + θ, where pm is the equilibrium market price. This means that
all types θ′ < θ must strictly prefer to sell to the government.
15Gorton and Ordon˜ez (forth) supports such a policy. During crises, debt contracts lose “information
insensitivity” as investors scrutinize the downside risk of underlying collaterals, leading to an adverse selection.
They argue that withhoding information on whether borrowers borrow from discount windows of central banks
can make debtors less information sensitive and alleviate adverse selection. As will be seen, secrecy has a more
nuanced effect in our model.
16The identities of banks borrowing from the discount window facilities (DW) are occasionally leaked to
either the news media or the market participants through a number of channels. First, despite the apparent
secrecy attached to DW, the access to DW by borrowing firms has been detected by news media (Armantier
et al., 2015; Berry, 2012). For instance, the Financial Times reported the news that Deutsche Bank had
borrowed from DW one day ago (see “Fed fails to calm money markets,” The Financial Times, August 20,
2007). Second, the market participants can identify DW borrowers from these banks’ market activities or
the information released by the Fed. On its weekly report, the Fed discloses whether there is an increase in
aggregate DW borrowing. In addition, financial institutions can observe whether a bank did not borrow or
lend at the federal funds market at that time. Combining all the information, one can easily identify a DW
borrower (Haltom, 2011).
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market nor selling to the government is observed, the former by assumption and the latter by
secrecy, firms need not worry about the signaling consequences of their t = 1 actions. Hence,
the equilibrium in t = 1 coincides with that of Theorem 1. Given no informational leakage,
the outcome of t = 2 coincides with the no-intervention benchmark.
Theorem 2 (Secret bailouts). Suppose the government offers to purchase assets at pg > p0
with full secrecy. Then, in equilibrium, firms accept the government offer in t = 1 if and only
if θ < pg + S. In t = 2, firms sell assets to the market at price p0 if and only if θ < θ0.
pg + S
θ0 = p0 + S
t = 1
the worst type the best type
t = 2
Note: the types selling to a market is depicted by blue and the types selling to the government
is depicted by red.
Figure 5 – Equilibrium with secret bailouts
4 Government Bailout and Stigma
We now turn to the two-period game whose timeline is depicted in Figure 1. We continue to
assume that the government offer is above the laissez-faire price: pg > p0. Otherwise, there is
only a trivial equilibrium in which the laissez-faire outcome prevails, with no firms accepting
the government offer.
We begin by analyzing the structure of a possible equilibrium. We focus on the equilibrium
that is obtained in the limit as the relative weight δ < 1 for the t = 2 payoff approaches 1.17
Lemma 1. In any equilibrium with pg > p0, there are three cutoffs 0 < θˆ ≤ θˆg ≤ θ2 such that
types θ ≤ θˆ sell assets in both periods, some measure of whom sell to the government and the
17The assumption of δ < 1 is meant to capture the fact that even though the reputational consequence of
accepting a bailout may be important, its effect does not outweigh the direct payoff consequence of the decision,
which appears to be first-order. Further, the reputational impact attached to bailouts does not usually persist
after the financial crises. For instance, the total TARP bank funds outstanding, after the launch of TARP
in October 2008, reached peak at $235.3 billion in February 2009, but sharply decreased to $80.4 billion
in January 2010 (go to https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/reports/Pages/
TARP-Tracker.aspx for more details). This observation indicates that the banks, after having joined TARP
during 2007-2009 Great Recession, had little trouble in funding at the markets after the crisis was over.
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remaining measure sell to the market in t = 1; types θ ∈ (θˆ, θˆg] sell only to the government in
t = 1 but do not sell in t = 2; types θ ∈ (θˆg, θ2] sell only in t = 2; and types θ > θ2 never sell
their assets in either period.
The structure of an equilibrium is depicted in Figure 6.
θˆ θˆg θ2
t = 1
the worst type the best type
t = 2
Figure 6 – General structure of equilibrium
Lemma 1 rests on several observations. First, firms’ preferences satisfy the single-crossing
property, implying that a lower type has more incentives to sell than a higher type in either
period; so the total number of units sold in equilibrium across the two periods must be non-
increasing in θ. Second, the fact that buyers (either the government or the market) never
ration sellers means that the quantity traded for each firm must be either zero or one in each
period. Third, an arbitrarily small discounting of the second-period payoff, along with the
first two observations, implies that, among those that sell only in one period, early sellers are
of lower types than late sellers. These observations give rise to the stated cutoff structure,
as depicted in Figure 6. We omit the formal proof since it follows from a standard argument
based on these observations.
In what follows, we limit attention to the case where pg is not so high—more precisely
pg < 1−S—that all firms accept the bailout.18 Then, Lemma 1 implies that there are only two
possible types of equilibria: (a) short-lived stimulation equilibria and (b) delayed stimulation
equilibria, depending on whether the stimulation effect of a bailout arises in t = 1 or delayed
to t = 2. More formally, these two types of equilibria correspond to the cases of θˆg = θ2
and of θˆg < θ2, respectively, in the cutoff structure characterized in Lemma 1. In the Online
Appendix B, we formally show that these are the only possible types of equilibria.
4.1 Short-lived Stimulation Equilibria
This type of equilibrium corresponds to the case of θˆg = θ2 in Lemma 1, and is depicted in
Figure 7. Importantly, the segment [θˆg, θ2] of firms selling in t = 2 in Lemma 1 (i.e., delayed
18Given the condition, we will have θˆg < 1. In case pg is higher so that all firms accept the bailout, the
second-period would coincide with the laissez-faire outcome. Such a boundary case is unrealistic in addition
to being very costly from a welfare perspective, as we discuss later.
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selling) is missing in this equilibrium. Consequently, a bailout triggers an immediate increase
in trade volume in t = 1, but, as we will argue, its effect will be short-lived.
θˆ θˆg
t = 1
the worst type the best type
t = 2
Note: the types selling to a market is depicted by blue and the types selling to the government
is depicted by red.
Figure 7 – Short-lived stimulation equilibrium
For the purpose of characterization, we suppose that an equilibrium of this type exists,
and investigate its properties. Specifically, fix an equilibrium in which the cutoffs defined in
Lemma 1 satisfy 0 < θˆ ≤ θˆg = θ2 < 1, as illustrated in Figure 7. First, consider types θ ≤ θˆ.
Let µg and µm be the fractions of these firms selling to the government and to the market in
t = 1, respectively, where µg +µm = 1. One can show that both fractions are strictly positive
in equilibrium.19 Let θg and θm denote respectively the mean values of the assets sold by the
two groups. First, pg2 = θg ≥ I, or else these firms would not sell in t = 2, a contradiction to
Lemma 1. Also, by definition,
µgθg + µmθm = E[θ|θ ≤ θˆ]. (3)
Next, let pm denote the price firms receive from selling to the market in t = 1. The t = 2
market price depends on whether or not a firm received the bailout in t = 1, as these events
are observed by buyers in t = 2. Let pg2 and p
m
2 denote respectively the prices offered in t = 2
to those that accepted the bailout and to those that did not in t = 1. In the short-lived
stimulation equilibrium, no firms sell only in t = 2, so the latter group consists of only those
that sold to the market in t = 1. Since buyers break even in expectation, we must have
pg2 = θg. Similarly, pm = p
m
2 = θm, since those that sold to the market in t = 1 are also
believed correctly to of type θm on average in both periods. Further, those firms selling in
19First, suppose µm = 0. Then, all types θ ≤ θˆg sell to the government in t = 1. But then, the holdouts
in t = 1 would be revealed in t = 2 to have types θ > θˆg. Given θˆg < 1, a positive measure of them will
attract buyers offering price higher than θˆg. This leads to θ2 > θˆg, a contradiction to the type of equilibrium
we are considering. Next, suppose µg = 0, hence all types θ ≤ θˆ sell to the market. We cannot have θˆ = θˆg,
since then no firm accepts bailout, and the laissez faire cannot support such a cutoff θˆg ≥ pg + S, where the
inequality is obtained earlier, since pg + S > p0 + S = θ0. Hence, θˆ < θˆg. But then, bailout recipients are
revealed to have types θ ≥ θˆ, hence attract offers higher than θˆ in t = 2, which contradicts the definition of θˆ
in Lemma 1.
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both periods must be indifferent between accepting the bailout and selling to the market in
t = 1:
pg + p
g
2 + 2S = pm + p
m
2 + 2S ⇐⇒ pg + θg = 2θm. (4)
Next, suppose further that θˆ < θˆg. Then, the cutoff type θˆ must be indifferent between
selling to the market in both periods and accepting the bailout in t = 1 and not selling in
t = 2:
2θm + 2S = θˆ + pg + S. (5)
Lastly, either the cutoff θˆg must be one or else the type θˆg must be indifferent between
accepting the bailout in t = 1 and not selling in t = 2 and not selling in either period. Hence,
θˆg = (pg + S) ∧ 1. (6)
From the necessary conditions on the cutoff types above, we can derive the following
properties of short-lived stimulation equilibria.
Theorem 3 (Short-lived stimulation equilibria). Suppose there exists a short-lived stimulation
equilibrium given pg > p0. Then,
(i) θg < θm < pg;
(ii) θˆ < θ0 < θˆg = pg + S;
(iii) pg < 2θ0 − E[θ|θ ≤ θ0].
Proof. See Appendix A. Q.E.D.
We highlight three features of short-lived stimulation equilibria. First, bailout recipients
suffer stigma. In the t = 2 market, bailout recipients are believed to be of type θg (on average),
while those that sell to the market in t = 1 are believed to be of type θm > θg. Thus, assets
held by bailout recipients are sold at discount precisely equal to ∆ = θm−θg, since the market
correctly infers the difference in their average asset values. Of course, this stigma must be
compensated in t = 1, or else no firms would accept the bailout. In particular, the government
must pay more than the market does for the asset in t = 1. Since the government offer is fixed
at pg, this means that the market in t = 1 must clear at price pg −∆. In other words, buyers
demand a haircut ∆ from firms selling to them for avoiding that stigma. Since the market is
competitive, buyers cannot earn positive profit, so what this simply means is that the average
type θm of firms selling to the market must (endogenously) equal pg −∆. It thus follows that
the bailout premium must precisely compensate the stigma, as is stated in (4).
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Second, the dregs-skimming by government bailout—featured prominently in Tirole’s model—
does not occur here. Bailout stigma here creates the incentive for high-type firms to mitigate
it or avoid it altogether. Selling to the market in t = 1 instead is one option, but it is subject
to a mark-down of asset price by ∆; effectively, bailout stigma has “spread” to market sellers
in t = 1. Another way to avoid the collateral damage is to accept the bailout but simply
withdraw from the t = 2 market. Indeed, types (θˆ, pg + S] find it strictly profitable to accept
the bailout but refuse to sell assets in t = 2 to avoid the stigma. Presence of these firms
undercuts the government’s role to take out the most toxic assets and to boost the market
reputation of the remaining firms. This has a long term effect, as we now turn to.
Third, as will be seen more clearly, the government bailout worsens the adverse selection
in the t = 2 market relative to no bailout. The government’s inability to dregs-skim—or to
take out the worst assets—makes stimulation short lived. In particular, high-type withdrawal
from the t = 2 market to avoid stigma exacerbates the reputation of firms that do participate
in the t = 2 market; they are effectively revealed to be of type θg on average. In fact, this
negative effect is so severe that the t = 2 market freezes more than if there were no bailout
in t = 1: only types θ ≤ θˆ sell in t = 2, where importantly θˆ < θ0. By comparison, all
types θ ≤ θ0 would have traded in t = 2 in the absence of bailout (recall Figure 3). Clearly,
transparency entails a strict loss of trade. Compared with a secret bailout, the volume of
trade (and investment) induced under the transparent bailout is the same in t = 1 but strictly
smaller in t = 2.
The properties identified so far are necessary but not sufficient for short-lived stimulation
equilibrium. For a short-lived stimulation equilibrium to exist, additional conditions must be
met. Specifically, buyers targeting bailout recipients should not gain from raising their offers
to attract the boycotters (i.e., types θ ∈ [θˆ, pg + S]), and the buyers targeting non-recipients
should have no incentives to raise their offers to attract holdouts (i.e., types θ > pg + S)
together with the market sellers. These conditions are formally stated and shown to be
sufficient in Online Appendix C.1.
These conditions are not easy to check, so it is difficult to establish the existence of the
equilibrium (or its sufficient condition) in a simple manner. Nevertheless, short-lived stimu-
lation equilibrium exists for a range of pg’s, for many common distribution functions F . For
example, Figure 9-(a) in Section 4.3) shows (a continuum of) short-lived stimulation equilibria
when F is uniform.
On the other hand, a short-lived stimulation equilibrium does not exist if pg is sufficiently
high. More precisely, as stated in (iii) of Theorem 3, the short-lived stimulation equilibrium
disappears if pg ≥ 2θ0−E[θ|θ ≤ θ0]. Roughly speaking, if pg is sufficiently high, accepting the
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government offer becomes very attractive and this breaks the no arbitrage condition (4).20 One
implication is that the policy maker can avoid triggering undesirable short-lived stimulation
equilibria if she were to make the bailout offer sufficiently generous—a point that will become
clear as we now turn to delayed stimulation equilibria.
4.2 Delayed Stimulation Equilibria
A delayed stimulation equilibrium has the structure that θˆ ≤ θˆg < θ2 in the characterization
in Lemma 1, and is illustrated in Figure 8. We call this delayed stimulation equilibrium since
much of the stimulation effect materializes in t = 2. In particular, the highest type that
trades does so in t = 2. Types θ < θˆg act similarly as in the short-lived stimulation equilibria:
nonnegative fractions µg and µm of types θ ≤ θˆ sell respectively to the government and to the
market, and types θ ∈ (θˆ, θˆg) sell only to the government, where θˆ ≤ θˆg.
θˆ = θ0 θˆg θ2 = pg + S
θg = θm = E[θ|θ ≤ θ0]
t = 1
the worst type the best type
t = 2
Note: the types selling to a market is depicted by blue and the types selling to the government
is depicted by red.
Figure 8 – Delayed stimulation equilibrium
What makes this equilibrium possible is the incentive that t = 2 buyers have to offer a
sufficiently high price to attract high-type firms who hold out in t = 1. Such an incentive was
absent in short-lived stimulation equilibria due to a sizable fraction µm of low-type market
sellers. These firms cannot be distinguished from high-type hold-out firms and, therefore,
would inflict a loss to buyers if they were to raise offers to attract high-type hold-out firms.
In a delayed stimulation equilibrium, the fraction µm of low-type market sellers is sufficiently
small, especially when pg is large, so that t = 2 buyers do have an incentive to attract high-type
holdouts, unlike in short-lived stimulation equilibria.
20To satisfy that condition—or equivalently, to support the sale at t = 1 market—the stigma ∆ = θm − θg
must increase, which further requires that firms selling to the t = 1 market must be of types close to θˆ. This
in turn reduces the fraction µm of these firms. If this fraction shrinks sufficiently, it is no longer incentive
compatible for buyers to buy only from these firms; it becomes profitable for buyers to deviate by raising their
offers to attract high-type firms that held out in t = 1 (i.e., types θ > pg + S), thus breaking the short-lived
stimulation equilibrium. See the proof of Theorem 3-(iii) in Appendix A for the supplementary analysis.
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We now provide characterization of delayed stimulation equilibria.
Theorem 4 (Delayed stimulation equilibria). In any delayed stimulation equilibrium, θˆ = θ0,
θˆg ∈ [θˆ, pg + S) and θ2 = pg + S. In particular, the following holds.
(i) Types θ ≤ θ0 sell in both periods, a positive (possibly the entire) measure of which accept
the bailout.
(ii) Among types θ ≤ θ0, those that sell to the market in t = 1 (if they exist) receive price p0
in t = 1 and pg from the t = 2 market, and those that accept the bailout sell assets at
price p0 in t = 2. Furthermore, these two groups of firms have the same average value
of E[θ|θ ≤ θ0] = p0.
(iii) Types θ ∈ (θ0, θˆg] sell only in t = 1 and to the government at pg.
(iv) Types θ ∈ (θˆg, pg +S] sell only in t = 2 at price pg. Higher-type firms never sell in either
period.
Proof. See Appendix A. Q.E.D.
We discuss below several features of delayed stimulation equilibria. First, just as in short-
lived stimulation equilibria, firms suffer from accepting a bailout. In t = 2, the market offers
price p0 to bailout recipients but pg > p0 to those that did not accept a bailout. But, unlike in
short-lived stimulation equilibria, this differential treatment is not attributed to the difference
in the average types between bailout recipients and market sellers in t = 1. Theorem 4-(ii)
shows that the average asset value is precisely the same for these two groups of firms and
equals p0 = E[θ|θ ≤ θ0]. The differential treatment is instead due to the high-type holdouts
in t = 1 that participate in the t = 2 market. Since buyers in t = 2 cannot distinguish these
firms from the t = 1 market sellers, the latter firms receive a better offer.
Just as before, the differential treatment by the t = 2 market of bailout recipients vis-a`-vis
market sellers in t = 1 can sustain in equilibrium only if it is counterbalanced by the opposite
treatment of these two groups in t = 1. Indeed, the government must pay more for the asset
than the market in t = 1 to compensate for the (relative) loss bailout recipients will suffer in
t = 2. As before, the payoffs of those who sell in both periods are equalized. In short-lived
stimulation equilibria, this payoff equalization, or no arbitrage, meant a “contagion of stigma”
to all firms selling in both periods, which resulted in the worsening of the adverse selection in
t = 2 than in the absence of bailout. This does not occur in delayed stimulation equilibria. It
is because adverse selection is ameliorated in delayed stimulation equilibria due to high-type
holdouts selling only in t = 2. As a result, bailout recipients are offered p0 = E[θ|θ ≤ θ0]
in t = 2, exactly the same as the market offer that would prevail absent any bailout by the
government.
The above discussions lead to the following key observation.
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Corollary 1. Each delayed stimulation equilibrium is equivalent to an equilibrium under secret
bailout (described in Theorem 2) in total volume of asset sales—and thus in total investments
undertaken by firms. The total volume of asset sales in any delayed stimulation equilibrium
exceeds that in short-lived stimulation equilibria.
Proof. By Theorem 4, the total volume of asset sales is F (θ0) + F (pg + S) in any delayed
stimulation equilibrium, which equals that under a secret bailout. It also exceeds the total
volume of asset sales in a short-lived stimulation equilibrium, F (θˆ) + F (pg + S), since θˆ <
θ0. Q.E.D.
One interesting, and perhaps surprising, implication of this result is that delays in the
effect of bailout should not be viewed as a policy failure, at least if one takes the secret
bailout equilibrium as an ideal benchmark. Take a possible equilibrium where θˆg is very low;
in fact, one can show that θˆg = θ0 can be supported if pg is not too high (again such an
equilibrium arises due to a large mass of high type firms holding out in t = 1). In such an
equilibrium, it may appear from the perspective of t = 1 commentators that bailouts have no
impact, since trading and investment activity have not changed after the government offer.
Their impression would be that the government purchase “crowded out” private purchase; a
positive measure of firms with θ ≤ θ0 sell to the government at a higher price pg than p0, the
price they would have sold at in the absence of bailouts. Indeed, in the wake of the Great
Recession, such a sentiment prevailed following the apparent lack of response by banks to the
first wave of stimulation policies.21
However, our result suggests that holdout by high-type firms (instead of taking the bailout
and boycotting the t = 2 market) is a blessing in disguise. The presence of these holdout
firms is precisely what leads the market to make very attractive offers to those that did not
accept the bailout. Indistinguishable from these holdout firms, those that actually sold to the
market in t = 1 also receive very attractive offers, thus overcoming their adverse selection.
The alleviation of adverse selection for these firms in turn creates “collateral benefits” to
those that accept the bailout, since no arbitrage means that they too can overcome stigma.
Consequently, the increase in trade volume in t = 2 more than makes up for the initial lack
of response, in comparison with short-lived stimulation equilibria.
From the policy maker’s perspective, bailouts could very well be seen as “working” mys-
teriously here. Paradoxically, the policy works here because it allows firms to send a strong
signal on their financial strength, by “rejecting” the bailout offer. This indirect signaling cre-
21In fact, as pointed out by Bolton, Santos and Scheinkman (2009), LIBOR-OIS spreads did not decrease
following the implementation of the Fed’s emergency lending programs (such as PDCF and TSLF) during the
2007 – 2009 Great Recession. Bolton, Santos and Scheinkman (2011) also argued that the public liquidity
programs, if implemented at a bad timing, will only crowd out the private liquidity supplied from the financial
market. As can be seen, our theory provides a different perspective on the same phenomenon.
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ates the desired stimulation effect later. As Corollary 1 suggests, the opportunity to “reject”
a bailout turns out to be more effective than “accepting” one.
To establish the existence of a delayed stimulation equilibrium, it is necessary to check that
buyers in each period do not have an incentive to deviate from the prescribed equilibrium
strategies on every equilibrium path. Just as with short-lived stimulation equilibria, it is
difficult to check these “no-deviation-by-buyers” conditions.22 However, the equilibrium exists
for a range of pg’s under general distribution functions. For example, the equilibrium exists
under the uniform distribution, as we show in Section 4.3
Corollary 1 also shows that, if a pg leads to a delayed stimulation equilibrium under the
transparent bailout, it also yields the same total volume of trade as under a secret bailout.
From this, one may conclude that bailout stigma need not be worrisome. However, there are
two caveats to this conclusion. First, there is a possibility of multiple equilibria as we show in
the next section. That is, the same pg may also support a short-lived stimulation equilibrium,
which is clearly undesirable as discussed previously. In order to avoid the selection of such
an equilibrium, a policy maker may have to raise pg beyond what she would otherwise offer.
Second, a delay in and of itself may be undesirable for reasons not modeled in our theory.
For instance, a prompt revitalization of economic activities often have external benefits for
the rest of the economy. In particular, if we consider financial institutions investing in the
real economy, a prompt restoration of their activities will have a positive spillover effect, and
from this perspective delayed stimulation can be harmful. For these reasons, one may view
the delay itself as a cost of stigma.
Remark 2 (The “full” freeze case: θ0 = 0). We have so far implicitly assumed θ0 > 0, for ease
of exposition. But our equilibrium characterizations from Theorems 3 and 4 extend even to the
case of θ0 = 0; i.e., when the market would freeze completely absent any bailout. In this case,
our characterizations imply that θˆ = 0, and this leads to existence of a unique equilibrium.
Given pg ≥ I, the equilibrium admits a threshold θˆg ∈ (0, pg +S ∧ 1) such that types θ ∈ [0, θˆg]
sell to the government in t = 1 but do not sell in t = 2, and types θ ∈ (θˆg, pg + S ∧ 1] hold
out in t = 1 but sell in t = 2 at price pg, where θˆg satisfies E[θ|θˆg ≤ θ ≤ pg + S] = pg. Types
θ > pg + S ∧ 1 sell in neither period. One can think of this as a form of delayed stimulation
equilibrium: a bailout does not revive market in t = 1 but induces delayed trading in t = 2.
In keeping with Corollary 1, the equilibrium induces the same trade volome as a secret bailout
would.
4.3 Uniform Distribution Example
To gain better understanding about the two types of equilibria and their possible coexistence,
it is useful to exhibit them in full detail for some concrete parameter values. Assume uniform
22Online Appendix C.2 presents these necessary conditions and show them to be sufficient for equilibrium.
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distribution F (θ) = θ, along with S = 1/3 and I = 1/10.
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(a) θˆ’s in short-lived stimulation equilibria
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Figure 9 – Equilibrium outcome in the uniform example (S = 1/3, I = 1/10)
The left panel (a) of Figure 9 depicts the set of threshold types θˆ supported in short-
lived stimulation equilibria for various bailout terms pg. The corresponding threshold for
delayed equilibria is θ0, depicted as dotted line. The right panel (b) of Figure 9 depicts the
total volume of trade induced by short-lived stimulation equilibria (blue area) and delayed
stimulation equilibria (red line) for differing levels of pg.
There are several interesting observations. First, as can be seen clearly by the blue area,
there is a continuum of short-lived stimulation equilibria that induce different threshold values
θˆ. Note also that short-lived stimulation equilibria exist for pg > p0 = S = 1/3 but not when
pg is sufficiently high. Specifically short-lived stimulation equilibria exist only for pg < 0.804,
which is well below the upper bound 2θ0 − E[θ|θ ≤ θ0] = 1 identified in Theorem 3-(iii).
Although not seen in the figure, there are typical multiple delayed equilibria (when at least
one exists), but all of them induce the same threshold θˆ = θ0 and the same total trade volume,
as formally stated in Theorem 4.
Second, both types of equilibria coexist for a range of pg’s, as can be seen in the figure.
This multiplicity reflects the endogenous nature of equilibrium belief formation. Given a pg,
suppose a large measure of high-type firms accept a bailout but boycott the t = 2 market
to avoid stigma. This causes buyers to adjust down their offers in the t = 2 market, in turn
validating the firms’ decision not to hold out in t = 1. A short-lived stimulation equilibrium
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then arises. By contrast, if a large measure of high-type firms hold out in t = 1 for the same
pg, then buyers in t = 2 make high offers to attract them, which in turn validates their decision
to hold out, leading to a delayed stimulation equilibrium.
Third, as can be seen from Figure 9-(b), the effect of bailout can be discontinuous with
respect to the terms of bailout. Suppose the policy maker raises the bailout term pg starting
from a low value close to p0 = 1/3. At first, a short-lived stimulation equilibria may arise.
As pg rises past 0.804, however, short-lived stimulation equilibria disappear and in the re-
sulting delayed stimulation equilibrium, the total trade volume jumps up albeit with delay.
As mentioned before, one policy implication is that the policy maker may need to choose an
attractive bailout offer (pg > 0.804 in this example) in order to avoid the selection of less
desirable short-lived stimulation equilibria.
Lastly, despite the stigma, a bailout with pg > p0 boosts overall trade regardless of the
types of equilibria selected. As shown in Figure 9-(b), the total trade volume in short-lived
stimulation equilibrium is strictly higher than 2F (θ0) = 4/3, the total trade volume in the
benchmark without bailout. This suggests that the positive effect of bailout on asset trading
in t = 1—i.e., every type θ ≤ pg + S sells in t = 1—outweighs the negative effect of stigma
on asset trading in t = 2. Further, as can be seen in Figure 9-(b), the total trade volume
in short-lived stimulation equilibrium tends to increase with pg, so a more generous bailout
tends to have a higher stimulation effect.
5 Cost of Bailouts and Welfare
In the preceding analysis, we have abstracted from the cost of bailouts although it is a crucial
part of policy debates. In this section, we evaluate alternative bailout equilibria and char-
acterize the optimal bailout term pg, with the cost of bailouts explicitly accounted for. To
model the cost, we follow the literature (Tirole, 2012; Chiu and Koeppl, 2016) and assume that
raising a dollar of public funds used for the asset purchase program costs the society (1 + λ)
dollars, where λ ≥ 0 represents the deadweight loss of raising public funds, e.g., distortionary
taxation. The welfare effect of a bailout policy would be then captured by the investment
surplus generated by the policy minus the total cost of raising public funds that the policy
would incur.
To evaluate the welfare of an equilibrium resulting from a bailout policy, it is convenient
to adopt a mechanism design perspective. In particular, we represent the outcome of an
equilibrium by a pair of mappings, (Q, T ) : [0, 1]→ {0, 1, 2}×R, induced by that equilibrium,
where Q(θ) ∈ {0, 1, 2} is a type-θ firm’s total asset sale across the two periods and T (θ) is the
total transfer it receives across the two periods in equilibrium. The transfer includes payment
from both the government (if the firm accepts a bailout) and private buyers (if it sells to the
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market in either period). For our analysis we can view these mappings as a direct mechanism
that implements a social choice as a function of report on the firm’s type θ. For this mechanism
to represent an equilibrium outcome, it must then satisfy the usual incentive compatibility and
participation conditions. One can then invoke the celebrated revenue equivalance or envelope
theorem to characterize the welfare of a particular equilibrium via the trade volume and a
payoff for a reference type (e.g., the highest type) induced by the equilibrium.
The next lemma provides this characterization.
Lemma 2. Any equilibrium outcome (Q, T ) arising from a bailout policy yields welfare:∫ 1
0
{
2θ + SQ(θ)− λ
[(
F (θ)
f(θ)
− S
)
Q(θ) + u− 2
]}
f(θ)dθ, (7)
where u ≥ 2 is the highest-type (θ = 1) firm’s payoff across the two periods in the equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A. Q.E.D.
The welfare of an equilibrium outcome consists of three terms. The first term, 2θ, is simply
the value of type-θ asset; recall that each firm owns 2 units of such asset, and its value does
not depend on who eventually owns that asset. The second term, SQ(θ), corresponds to the
return from the project enabled by the sale of type-θ asset represented by Q(θ). The last term
accounts for the cost of bailouts. In particular, the terms inside the square brackets correspond
to the budget shortfall arising from the equilibrium.23 Recall that private buyers break even
in expectation in any equilibrium. Hence, each of this budget shortfall must be paid for by
public funds and thus incurs the social cost of λ. The budget shortfall consists of three terms.
The term, u− 2, is the rent that the highest-type (θ = 1) firm enjoys in equilibrium above its
asset value 2. (By the standard envelope theorem reasoning, this rent must accrue to “all”
firm types.) The next term, F (θ)
f(θ)
Q(θ), is the incentive cost that is required to induce type-θ
firm to sell additional unit of its asset: since any sale by type θ can be mimicked profitably by
all lower types, these types must be paid rents to prevent their mimicking. Since higher types
can be mimicked by more types, the incentive cost is increasing in θ. Last, project returns
SQ(θ) act as an incentive for sale by type θ: they mitigate the budget shortfall and save the
subsidy needed to induce a sale.
The fact that sale by a higher type incurs a higher social cost provides a key argument for
comparing equilibrium outcomes. To see this, fix an equilibrium, say A, with allocation QA(·)
23Again, letting Θg denote the types of firms that accept the bailout, the government suffers a loss of∫
Θg
(pg − θ)f(θ)dθ =
∫ 1
0
(T (θ)− θQ(θ))f(θ)dθ = u− 2 +
∫ 1
0
(
F (θ)
f(θ)
− S
)
Q(θ)f(θ)dθ,
where we used the envelope theorem to substitute for T (θ).
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resulting from a bailout at pg. Suppose the policy maker, with some bailout term p
′
g 6= pg, can
trigger another equilibrium, say B, with allocation QB(·), such that (a) the aggregate trade
volume remains unchanged; i.e., E[QA(θ)] = E[QB(θ)] but that (b) B “reallocates” sales away
from high-type firms towards low-type firms; i.e., QB(θ) R QA(θ) if θ Q θˇ for some θˇ. Then, a
shift from A to B preserves the same stimulation effect, and thus the same investment returns,
but incurs a lower budget deficit borne by the government, and thus a lower social cost.
This reasoning establishes the social cost of bailout stigma as follows.
Theorem 5 (Welfare cost of bailout stigma). Fix any bailout offer pg that yields a short-lived
stimulation equilibrium under a transparent bailout. Then, there exists a p′g < pg such that a
secret bailout with p′g yields strictly higher welfare than the short-lived stimulation equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A. Q.E.D.
Intuively, the additional welfare cost of a short-lived stimulation equilibrium is attributed
to the overall market-freezing effect caused by bailout stigma. In the equilibrium, bailout
stigma discourages firms not only from accepting a bailout but also from selling to the market
in t = 1. This means that, in order to induce the same trade volume as under a secret
bailout, the government must raise its bailout term pg, which leads to a higher cost of public
intervention.
Given the outcome equivalence between a delayed stimulation equilibrium under transpar-
ent bailout and the equilibrium under secret bailout (Corollary 1), the following corollary is
immediate.
Corollary 2. A delayed stimulation equilibrium given any bailout term pg yields identical
welfare as a secret bailout given the same bailout term.
6 Related Literature
While the broad theme of this paper is related to an extensive literature on the benefits
and costs of government intervention in distressed banks,24 our work is most closely related to
Philippon and Skreta (2012) and Tirole (2012), who focus on adverse selection in asset markets
24The primary rationale for intervention is to prevent the contagion of bank runs whether it stems from
depositor panic (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983), contractual linkages in bank lending (Allen and Gale, 2000),
or aggregate liquidity shortages (Diamond and Rajan, 2005). The costs of anticipated bailouts due to the
time-inconsistency of policy are discussed by, among others, Stern and Feldman (2004).
25
as a primary reason for government intervention.25 As mentioned previously, these studies do
not explicitly study the dynamic consequence of receiving a bailout—the focus of the current
study. Even though these papers recognize that relatively low types accept bailouts, this does
not translate into an adverse effect on subsequent financing in their models. Our dynamic
model captures not only how bailout stigma affects firms’ financing behavior but also how
the stigma fundamentally alters the role of a bailout. In particular, its role in enabling firms
to send a favorable signal by “refusing” an attractive bailout offer is the single most striking
takeaway that has no analogues in these or other antecedent studies.
Banks’ reputational concerns are explicitly considered in Ennis and Weinberg (2013), La’O
(2014), and Chari, Shourideh and Zetlin-Jones (2014). In Ennis and Weinberg (2013), to meet
their short-term liquidity needs, banks with high-quality assets use interbank lending while
those with low-quality assets use the discount window. The resulting discount window stigma
is reflected in the subsequent pricing of assets. In La’O (2014), financially strong banks use
the Federal Reserve’s Term Auction Facility since winning the auction at a premium signals
financial strength, which protects them from predatory trading. The main focus in Chari,
Shourideh and Zetlin-Jones (2014) is on how reputational concerns in secondary loan markets
can result in persistent adverse selection. Since all three studies consider discrete types of
banks and there is no government bailout, their results are not directly comparable to ours.
Our paper is also related to studies on dynamic adverse selection in general (Inderst and
Mu¨ller, 2002; Janssen and Roy, 2002; Moreno and Wooders, 2010; Camargo and Lester, 2014;
Fuchs and Skrzypacz, 2015) and those with a specific focus on the role of information in
particular (Ho¨rner and Vieille, 2009; Daley and Green, 2012; Fuchs, O¨ry and Skrzypacz, 2016;
Kim, 2017).26 The key insight from the first set of studies is that dynamic trading generates
sorting opportunities, which are not available in the static market setting. However, each seller
has only one opportunity to trade in these studies, so signaling is not an issue. The second
set of studies relates to different disclosure rules and how they affect dynamic trading. For
example, Ho¨rner and Vieille (2009) and Fuchs, O¨ry and Skrzypacz (2016) show that secrecy
(private offers) tends to alleviate adverse selection but transparency (public offers) does not.
Once again, each seller has only one trading opportunity in these studies. Hence, although
past rejections can boost reputation, acceptance ends the game. In contrast, in our model,
25Regarding the optimal form of bailouts, Philippon and Skreta (2012) show that optimal interventions
involve the use of debt instruments when adverse selection is the main issue. With additional moral hazard
but limits on pledgeable income, Tirole (2012) justifies asset purchases. When there is debt overhang due to
lack of capital, Philippon and Schnabl (2013) find that optimal interventions take the form of capital injection
in exchange for preferred stock and warrants. During the US subprime crisis, the EESA initially granted
the Secretary of the Treasury authority to purchase or insure troubled assets owned by financial institutions.
However, the Capital Purchase Program under TARP switched to capital injection against preferred stock
and warrants.
26Others include dynamic extensions of Spence’s signaling model with public offers (Noldeke and
Van Damme, 1990), private offers (Swinkels, 1999), and private offers with additional public information
such as grades (Kremer and Skrzypacz, 2007).
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acceptance as well as rejection of the bailout offer work as signaling opportunities. Although
our model also shows that secret bailouts weakly dominate transparent bailouts, none of these
papers studies government intervention in response to market failure.
There are several empirical studies that provide evidence on stigma in the financial market.
Peristiani (1998) provides early evidence on the discount window stigma. Furfine (2001, 2003)
finds similar evidence from the Federal Reserve’s Special Lending Facility during the period
1999-2000 and the new discount window facility introduced in 2003. As mentioned earlier,
Armantier et al. (2015) utilize the Federal Reserve’s Term Auction Facility bid data from
the 2007-2008 financial crisis to estimate the cost of stigma and its effect. Cassola, Hortac¸su
and Kastl (2013) find evidence of stigma from the bidding data from the European Central
Bank’s auctions of one-week loans. Krishnamurthy, Nagel and Orlov (2014) find that in
repo financing, dealer banks with higher shares of agency collateral repayments (implicitly)
guaranteed by the government borrowed less from the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF)
despite its attractive funding terms, which indeed supports there being a stigma attached to
the users of the PDCF.
7 Conclusion
The current paper has studied a dynamic model of a government bailout in which firms have a
continuing need to fund their projects by selling their assets. Asymmetric information about
the quality of assets gives rise to adverse selection and a concommitant market freeze, which
provides a rationale for a government bailout, just as in Tirole (2012). However, in contrast
to Tirole (2012), markets stigmatize bailout recipients, which jeopardizes their ability to fund
subsequent projects. The presence of this bailout stigma and other dynamic incentives yields
a much more complex and nuanced portrayal of how bailouts impact the economy than have
been recognized in the extant literature.
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. The bailout stigma necessitates the
government to pay a premium over the market terms to compensate for the stigma. Even so,
market rejuvenation can be short-lived and adverse selection can worsen in subsequent market
trading, resulting in a market freeze even more severe than in the absence of a bailout. This
requires the government to further increase a premium. A more attractive bailout premium can
be effective in stimulating trade and investment, but its effects are delayed. Delayed benefits
materialize as bailouts provide firms with opportunities to boost reputation by “rejecting”
bailout offers. This improves their ability to trade in the market in subsequent periods.
Indeed, there is no welfare loss in this case relative to a secret bailout that does not entail
stigma. Thus delayed effects of bailouts can be a blessing in disguise, subject to two important
caveats: the government may need to run a large budget deficit to support delayed market
stimulation, and delay in and of itself may be undesirable for reasons not modeled in the
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current paper.
The central lesson from the current work is that, compared with the static setting, the
effects of bailouts are very different due to the interplay between the bailout stigma, the
market’s belief within and across periods, and rich signaling opportunities firms have in the
dynamic context. To the best of our knowledge, the insights we develop and the forces we
identify are novel and have not been recognized in the previous literature and should be part
of the framework for conducting future policy debates and empirical studies.
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Appendix
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof of (i): θg < θm < pg. We first establish the following claim.
Claim 1. θg < θm.
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Proof: Suppose to the contrary that θg ≥ θm, which in turn implies pg ≤ θm from (4).
Given Lemma 1, there are two possible cases to consider: θˆ < θˆg or θˆ = θˆg.
Suppose first θˆ < θˆg. Then, we have θˆg ≤ pg + S from (6). Moreover, we have from (3)
that θm ≤ E[θ|θ ≤ θˆ] ≤ E[θ|θ ≤ pg + S]. Since pg > p0, we must have E[θ|θ ≤ pg + S] < pg,
or else pg ≤ p0 (recall definition of p0 from (1) as well as Figure fig:akerlof). Hence, θm < pg,
which, however, contradicts the earlier hypothesis pg ≤ θm.
Suppose next θˆ = θˆg. Then, a type-θˆ firm must be indifferent between selling in both
periods and selling in neither period if θˆ < 1 and (weakly) prefer selling in both periods
if θˆ = 1. Hence, we must have 2θˆ ≤ 2θm + 2S, where the inequality holds strictly only
if θˆ = 1. We thus conclude that θˆ = (θm + S) ∧ 1. Moreover, we have from (3) that
θm ≤ E[θ|θ ≤ θˆ] ≤ E[θ|θ ≤ θm + S], which implies θm ≤ p0 (again by the definition of θ0
in (1)). Since pg > p0, this again contradicts an earlier hypothesis that pg ≤ θm. We thus
conclude that θg < θm. .
By (4), Claim 1 in turn implies that θm < pg. We have thus proven (i). 
Proof of (ii): θˆ < θ0 < θˆg = pg + S. We first establish the following two claims:
Claim 2. θˆ 6= 1.
Proof: Suppose to the contrary that θˆ = 1. Then, θˆ = 1 ≤ θg +S. Otherwise, we will have
pg + S + θˆ > pg + θg + 2S = 2θm + 2S, where the equality is from (4), so a type-θˆ firm would
deviate by accepting the bailout but boycotting the t = 2 market. Since θg < θm (by Claim
1) and µgθg + µmθm = E[θ|θ ≤ θˆ] = E[θ|θ ≤ 1], we have
1 ≤ θg + S < µgθg + µmθm + S ≤ E[θ|θ ≤ 1] + S.
But this contradicts θ0 < 1, which we assume throughout. 
Claim 3. θˆ < θˆg.
Proof: Suppose to the contrary that θˆ = θˆg. By Claim 2, we have θˆ = (θm + S) ∧ 1 and
pg > θm. In equilibrium, each type θ > θˆ never sells in either period and obtains payoff 2θ.
Since pg > θm, however, types θ ∈ (θˆg, pg + S) will have a strictly higher payoff than 2θ by
selling to the government in t = 1, a contradiction. 
We are now ready to prove (ii). We first show that θˆg > θ0. Since pg > p0, it is straight-
forward from (6) that θˆg = (pg + S) ∧ 1 > θ0. We next prove θˆ < θ0. Since θˆ < θˆg by Claim
3, we have
θˆ = θg + S < E[θ|θ ≤ θˆ] + S,
where the equality follows from (4) and (5), and the strict inequality follows from θg < θm
and (3). The definition of θ0 then implies θˆ < θ0. 
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Proof of (iii): a short-lived stimulation equilibrium exists only if pg < 2θ0 − E[θ|θ ≤ θ0]. To
prove this, observe from (4) that
pg = 2θm − θg.
Fixing θˆ, the RHS is maximized when, for some threshold θ˜ ∈ [0, θˆ], all types θ > θ˜ sell
to the market and all types θ < θ˜ sell to the government so that θm = E[θ|θ ∈ (θ˜, θˆ]] and
θg = E[θ|θ ≤ θ˜]. Hence,
pg = 2θm − θg
≤ max
θ˜∈[0,θˆ],θˆ∈[0,θ0)
2E[θ|θ ∈ (θ˜, θˆ]]− E[θ|θ ≤ θ˜]
< max
θ˜∈[0,θ0]
2E[θ|θ ∈ (θ˜, θ0]]− E[θ|θ ≤ θ˜]
= 2θ0 − E[θ|θ ≤ θ0],
where the strict inequality follows from θˆ < θ0 and E[θ|θ ∈ (a, b)] is increasing in b for all
0 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ 1, and the last equality follows from the regularity condition that 2E[θ|θ ∈
(a, b)]− E[θ|θ ≤ a] is increasing in a for all 0 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ 1. 
A.2 Proof of Theorem 4
As before, let µg and µm respectively denote the fractions of types θ ≤ θˆ that sell to the
government and to the market in t = 1, and let θg and θm denote their average values.
Obviously, (3) must continue to hold. Let pm be the market price for the asset in t = 1, and
let pg2 and p
m
2 respectively denote the t = 2 prices for those that sold to the government and
those that did not. Note that pm2 applies to those that sold to the market in t = 1 and to
those that held out, since t = 2 cannot distinguish them.
We wish to prove that θˆ = θ0, θ2 = pg + S, and µg > 0. There are two possible cases:
θˆg > θˆ and θˆg = θˆ, and we treat them separately. (Recall by definition θˆg ≥ θˆ.)
A.2.1 The case of θˆg > θˆ.
In this case, firms with θ ∈ (θˆ, θˆg] sell to the government in t = 1. Obviously, µg ≥
∫ θˆg
θˆ
f(θ)dθ >
0. We only need to prove θˆ = θ0 and θ2 = pg + S.
We first show θ2 = pg +S. Observe that a type-θˆg firm must be indifferent between selling
only in t = 1 to the government at pg and selling only in t = 2 at price p
m
2 . Hence, we must
have pm2 = pg. Since a type-θ2 firm must be indifferent between selling only in t = 2 at price
pm2 and not selling in any period, we must have θ2 = p
m
2 + S = pg + S.
We next show θˆ = θ0. We restrict our focus on the case µg > 0 and µm > 0 (The argument
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for the other case µm = 0 is similar, so we omit the proof). Then, these firms sell in both
periods, and thus must be indifferent between selling to the government and to the market in
t = 1. This implies (4), or
pg + p
g
2 = pm + p
m
2 = pm + pg ⇒ pm = pg2.
This, together with the zero-profit condition, implies that
θg = p
g
2 = pm = θm. (8)
It then follows from (3) that
θg = θm = E[θ|θ ≤ θˆ]. (9)
Next, a type-θˆ firm must be indifferent between selling in both periods and selling only in
t = 1 to the government at price pg:
pm + pg + 2S = pg + S + θˆ ⇐⇒ pm + S = θˆ, (10)
which, together with (8) and (9), implies that
E[θ|θ ≤ θˆ] + S = θˆ.
By definition of θ0, or (1), we then have θˆ = θ0. This in turn implies pm = p
g
2 = E[θ|θ ≤ θ0] =
p0.
A.2.2 The case of θˆg = θˆ.
The proof proceeds in several claims.
Claim 4. µg > 0.
Proof: Suppose to the contrary that µg = 0. Then, we must have p
m
2 = p0 since buyers in
t = 2 do not observe any action taken by firms in t = 1. This implies p0 = p
m
2 = pg > p0, a
contradiction. 
Claim 5. θ2 = pg + S.
Proof: Since types θ ∈ (θˆ, θ2) must weakly prefer selling only in t = 2 at price pm2 to
selling only in t = 1 to the government at price pg. This implies p
m
2 ≥ pg. We now prove that
pm2 = pg. Suppose to the contrary that p
m
2 > pg.
We know from Claim 4 that µg > 0. Suppose µm > 0. No arbitrage between selling to the
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government and selling to the market in t = 1 means that pg + p
g
2 = pm + p
m
2 , so we have
pg2 = (p
m
2 − pg) + pm > pm, (11)
where the strict inequality follows from our hypothesis above that pm2 > pg. Furthermore,
since type θˆ must be indifferent between selling in both periods and selling only in t = 2 at
pm2 , we must have
θˆ + pm2 + S = pm + p
m
2 + 2S =⇒ θˆ = pm + S. (12)
By the zero profit condition, pg2 = θg and pm = θm. Hence, by (11), we have θg > θm. By (3),
we must have
E[θ|θ ≤ θˆ] > θm = pm. (13)
Then (13) and (12) imply
E[θ|θ ≤ θˆ] + S > θˆ. (14)
This means that θˆ < θ0, by the definition of θ0. By (13), this means that
pm = θm < E[θ|θ ≤ θˆ] < E[θ|θ ≤ θ0] = p0,
where the last equality follows from the definition of p0. Suppose a buyer deviates and offers
p′ ∈ (pm, p0). Since p′ + pm2 > pm + pm2 = pg + pg2 for any p′ ∈ (pm, p0), all types θ ≤ θˆ will sell
to this deviating buyer. Furthermore, since pg + S + θ ≤ p′ + S + pm2 + S =⇒ θ ≤ p′ + S for
any p′ ∈ (pm, p0), types θ ∈ (θˆ, p′ + S] will sell at the deviation price, too. Since p′ < p0, we
have E[θ|θ ≤ p′ + S]− p′ > 0, so the deviating buyer will enjoy a strict profit. We have thus
obtained a contradiction to the hypothesis that pm2 > pg. A similar conclusion is also obtained
when µm = 0.
27 We therefore conclude that pm2 = pg. Since θ2 = p
m
2 + S, this in turn implies
that θ2 = pg + S. 
Claim 6. θˆ = θ0.
Proof: We know from Claim 4 that µg > 0. There are two cases depending on whether
µm > 0 or µm = 0. Consider the former first. No arbitrage for type θ ∈ [0, θˆ] between selling
to the government and selling to the market in t = 1 implies pg + p
g
2 = pm + p
m
2 , which in
turn implies pg2 = pm since pg = p
m
2 . By the zero-profit condition, p
g
2 = θg and pm = θm, so
by the zero-profit condition θg = θm. Hence, by (3), we get pm = E[θ|θ ≤ θˆ]. Combining this
equality with (12), we have
θˆ = E[θ|θ ≤ θˆ] + S.
By definition of θ0, the above equality implies θˆ = θ0.
27In this case, again the indifference for type θˆ gives pg + E[θ|θ ≤ θˆ] + S = θˆ + pm2 . Since pm2 > pg, this
implies θˆ < θ0, or E[θ|θ ≤ θˆ] < p0. This creates an opportunity for buyers to profitably deviating by offering
a price p′m ∈ (E[θ|θ ≤ θˆ], p0).
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Consider next µm = 0. Type θˆ must be indifferent now between selling to the government
in t = 1 followed by selling to the t = 2 market (with stigma) and selling only in t = 2 market.
Hence,
pg2 + pg + 2S = θˆ + p
2
m + S. (15)
In the proof of Claim 5, we already proved that p2m = pg. Hence, (15) reduces to
pg2 + S = θˆ. (16)
Further, by the zero profit condition,
pg2 = θm = E[θ|θ < θˆ], (17)
where the second equality holds since µm = 0. Combining (16) and (17) gives
θˆ = E[θ|θ < θˆ] + S,
which proves that θˆ = θ0. 
A.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Fix a direct mechanism (Q, T ). Define u(θ˜|θ) := T (θ˜) + θ(2−Q(θ˜)) + SQ(θ˜) as type-θ firm’s
payoff when it reports its type as θ˜. Since the mechanism must be incentive compatible for all
types, we have u(θ|θ) ≥ u(θ˜|θ) for all θ˜, θ ∈ [0, 1]. Let u(θ) := u(θ|θ). Since the participation
constraint must be satisfied for all types, we also have u(θ) ≥ 2θ for all θ ∈ [0, 1]. Let u = u(1)
be the highest-type (θ = 1) firm’s payoff in equilibrium. Then, one can apply the envelope
theorem to find u(θ) = u− ∫ 1
θ
(2−Q(s))ds.
To calculate the welfare, let Θg denote the set of θ’s that sell to the government in t = 1.
The welfare is the sum of the payoffs for firms and buyers minus the deadweight loss from a
deficit run by the government. Given the government offer pg, the welfare is then written as∫ 1
0
[u(θ) + (θQ(θ)− T (θ))] f(θ)dθ − λ ∫
θ∈Θg(pg − θ)f(θ)dθ. Since buyers in the market must
break even, we have
∫
θ∈Θg(pg − θ)f(θ)dθ =
∫ 1
0
(T (θ) − θQ(θ))f(θ)dθ. Hence, the welfare is∫ 1
0
[u(θ) + (θQ(θ)− T (θ))− λ(T (θ)− θQ(θ))] f(θ)dθ. By plugging u(θ) = u− ∫ 1
θ
(2−Q(s))ds
into the welfare and integrating by parts, we obtain (7).
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A.4 Proof of Theorem 5
Consider a transparent bailout with pg that yields a short-lived stimulation equilibrium and
let (QSL, TSL) denote the corresponding outcome (expressed in a direct mechanism). Then,
we have QSL(θ) = 2 if θ ∈ [0, θˆ], QSL(θ) = 1 if θ ∈ (θˆ, (pg + S) ∧ 1], and QSL(θ) = 0
otherwise. Hence, the total trade volume induced by the short-lived stimulation equilibrium
is F (θˆ) + F ((pg + S) ∧ 1). Furthermore, the utility of the highest-type firm, denoted by uSL,
is equal to 1 + ((pg + S) ∨ 1). Next, consider an equilibrium under a secret bailout with p′g
and let (QS, TS) denote the corresponding outcome. Then we have QS(θ) = 2 if θ ∈ [0, θ0],
QS(θ) = 1 if θ ∈ (θ0, (p′g + S) ∧ 1], and QS(θ) = 0 otherwise. Thus, the total trade volume
in this case is F (θ0) + F ((p
′
g + S) ∧ 1), and the utility of the highest-type firm, denoted by
uS, is equal to 1 + ((pg + S) ∨ 1). Suppose the secret bailout with p′g yields the same total
trade volume as the short-lived stimulation equilibrium under the transparent bailout with
pg. Since θˆ < θ0 from Theorem 3, we must have (p
′
g + S) ∧ 1 < (pg + S) ∧ 1, which implies
p′g < pg. This also implies uS = 1 + ((p
′
g + S) ∨ 1) ≤ 1 + ((pg + S) ∨ 1) = uSL.
We next show that the secret bailout with p′g yields strictly higher welfare than the short-
lived stimulation equilibrium arising from pg, if the secret bailout induces the same total
trade volume as the short-lived stimulation equilibrium does. From (7), the welfare difference
between the two types of equilibria is∫ 1
0
{
S(QS(θ)−QSL(θ))− λ
[(
F (θ)
f(θ)
− S
)
(QS(θ)−QSL(θ)) + (uS − uSL)
]}
f(θ)dθ
=(1 + λ)S
∫ 1
0
(QS(θ)−QSL(θ))f(θ)dθ + λ
∫ 1
0
[
F (θ)
f(θ)
(QSL(θ)−QS(θ)) + (uSL − uS)
]
f(θ)dθ
=λ
∫ 1
0
[
F (θ)
f(θ)
(QSL(θ)−QS(θ)) + (uSL − uS)
]
f(θ)dθ
≥λ
∫ 1
0
F (θ)
f(θ)
(QSL(θ)−QS(θ))f(θ)dθ
>λ
[
F (θ0)
f(θ0)
∫ θ0
0
(QSL(θ)−QS(θ))f(θ)dθ + F (θ0)
f(θ0)
∫ 1
θ0
(QSL(θ)−QS(θ))f(θ)dθ
]
=λ
F (θ0)
f(θ0)
∫ 1
0
(QSL(θ)−QS(θ))f(θ)dθ = 0,
where the second and last equalities follow from
∫ 1
0
(QS(θ) − QSL(θ))f(θ)dθ = 0, the weak
inequality follows from uSL ≥ uS, and the strict inequality follows from the facts that F (θ)f(θ) is
strictly increasing in θ,
∫ θ0
0
(QSL(θ)−QS(θ))f(θ)dθ < 0, and
∫ 1
θ0
(QSL(θ)−QS(θ))f(θ)dθ > 0.
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Online Appendix
B Possible Types of Equilibria
In this section, we show that there are only two types of equilibria, short-lived stimulation
and delayed stimulation types. To this end, recall first from Lemma 1 that every equilibrium
must have a cutoff structure 0 ≤ θˆ ≤ θˆg ≤ θ2 ≤ 1 such that firms with types 0 ≤ θˆ sell in both
periods (either to the government or to the market in t = 1); types θ ∈ (θˆ, θˆg] sell in t = 1 but
not in t = 2; types θ ∈ (θˆg, θ2] sell only in t = 2; types θ > θ2 do not sell in either period.
Lemma 3. In the presence of government bailouts, there are only two possible types of equi-
libria, 0 < θˆ < θˆg = θ2 ≤ 1 (short-lived stimulation type) or 0 < θˆ ≤ θˆg < θ2 ≤ 1 (delayed
stimulation type).
Proof. For the purpose of exposition, let pm, p
g
2, and p
m
2 denote equilibrium asset prices
offered to all firms at the market in t = 1, the bailout recipients (i.e., the firms that sold to
the government in t = 1) in t = 2, and the bailout holdouts (i.e., the firms that did not sell
to the government in t = 1) in t = 2, respectively. Note that there are no firms that sell to
the market in t = 1 but not in t = 2: if there were such firms, buyers in t = 2 would offer pm
to attract these firms.
It suffices to prove that θˆ > 0 and θˆ < max{θˆg, θ2}. We prove these claims in sequence.
Step 1. θˆ > 0.
Suppose to the contrary that there exists an equilibrium with θˆ = 0; namely, no firms sell
assets in both periods. There are two possible cases: θˆg = 0 or θˆg > 0.
Suppose first θˆg = 0, there will be no asset trading in t = 1. Then, there is no updating
on firms’ types in t = 2, so t = 2 buyers hold the prior belief about firms’ types, leading to
θ2 = θ0 > 0. However, by definition of θ0 and p0, a buyer in t = 1 can profitably deviate by
offering p′ ∈ (I, p0). Hence, θˆg > 0.
Next, suppose θˆg > 0. Once again, there are two possible cases, θˆg = θ2 and θˆg < θ2. We
first show that it is impossible to have 0 < θˆg = θ2 < 1. If 0 < θˆg = θ2 < 1, this means that
no firms with θ > θˆg sell in t = 2. However, a buyer in t = 1 can profitably deviate by offering
a p′ > θˆg −S: the strict log-concavity property of f(·) implies f(·)/(1−F (θˆg)) is also strictly
log-concave, and thus there exists a θ′ > θˆg such that p′ = θ′−S and E[θ|θˆg < θ ≤ θ′]−p′ > 0.
If 0 < θˆg = θ2 = 1, we have θˆg > θ0. By definition of θ0, however, a buyer in t = 2 can
profitably deviate by offering p′ = p0 − ε for a sufficiently small ε to the bailout recipients.
Consider next 0 < θˆg < θ2 ≤ 1. Since a firm sells only in t = 1 to the government at pg
or only in t = 2 to the market at pm2 (recall by hypothesis no firm sells in both periods), no
arbitrage implies pg = p
m
2 . There are two possible cases: θˆg ≥ θ0 or θˆg < θ0. If θˆg ≥ θ0, a buyer
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in t = 2 can profitably deviate by offering p′ ∈ [I, p0) to the firms that sold to the government
in t = 1. If θˆg < θ0, a buyer in t = 1 can profitably deviate by offering p
′ ∈ (max{θˆg−S.I}, p0):
since buyers in t = 2 will offer pm2 = pg to any firm that did not sell to the government, all
firms with types θ ≤ p′ + S will sell at p′ in t = 1 and the sale is profitable for the buyer (by
definition of p0). Consequently, there cannot exist any equilibrium with θˆ = 0.
Step 2. θˆ < max{θˆg, θ2}.
Suppose to the contrary that there is an equilibrium with 0 < θˆ = θˆg = θ2. This means
that no firm sells only in one period. We first show that there are positive measures of firms
sell to the government and to the market in t = 1 (that is, in terms of our notation in the
text, µg ∈ (0, 1)). If all types θ ≤ θˆ refuse the bailout, the equilibrium is same as that without
bailouts, and thus θˆ = θ0. Since pg > p0, however, types θ ∈ (θ0, pg + S] will deviate and sell
to the government in t = 1. If all types θ ≤ θˆ accept the bailout, there are two possible cases,
either θˆ > θ0 or θˆ ≤ θ0. In the former case, we must have θˆ ≤ pg2 + S, which implies pg2 > p0.
However, such a price cannot break even for the t = 2 buyers. In the latter case, firms with
types θ ∈ (θˆ, pg + S] will deviate and sell to the government in t = 1. We have thus proven
that positive measures of firms sell to the government and to the market in t = 1.
Since all firms that sold to the market in t = 1 also sell in t = 2, the zero-profit condition
and the supposition θˆ = θˆg = θ2 imply pm = p
m
2 . For expositional convenience, we throughout
abuse the notation pm as the equilibrium price offered in both periods to the firms that did
not sell to the government. Since a type-θˆ firm is indifferent between selling in both periods
and not selling in any period, we must have 2θˆ = 2pm + 2S, or equivalently θˆ = pm + S. If
pm < pg, types θ ∈ (θˆ, pg + S] will deviate and sell to the government in t = 1. Hence, we
must have pm ≥ pg, and thus θˆ ≥ pg + S > θ0. Since the no-arbitrage condition for types
θ ≤ θˆ implies pg + pg2 = 2pm, we must have pm ≤ pg2. Since the equilibrium prices pm and pg2
must break even for the t = 2 buyers, we must have E[θ|θ ≤ θˆ] = µgpg2 + (1 − µg)pm, which
implies
E[θ|θ ≤ θˆ] + S ≥ pm + S = θˆ.
By the definitin of θ0 (see (1)), we must then have θˆ ≤ θ0, but this contracts an earlier
observation that θˆ > θ0. Therefore, an equilibrium with 0 < θˆ = θˆg = θ2 cannot exist for any
pg > p0. Q.E.D.
C Detailed Analysis of Equilibria
In the text, we characterized the necessary conditions for both types of equilibria (short-
lived stimulation and delayed stimulation types). In this section, we present all the necessary
conditions in detail and show them they are sufficient for equilibrium.
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C.1 Short-lived Stimulation Equilibrium
In a short-lived stimulation equilibrium, firms with types θ ≤ θˆ sell in both periods: a fraction
µg of these firms sell to the government at pg in t = 1 and to the market at p
g
2 in t = 2, and the
remaining fraction µm = 1−µg of them sell to the market at pm in both periods. In addition,
types θ ∈ (θˆ, θˆg] sell to the government at pg in t = 1 but do not sell in t = 2 (i.e., boycott
the t = 2 market), and types θ > θˆg do not sell in either period. Let θg denote the average
value of types of the bailout recipients that sell to the market in t = 2, and let θm denote
the average value of types that sell to the market in both periods. The zero-profit condition
implies that pg2 = θg and pm = θm.
There are several necessary conditions for the existence of short-lived stimulation equilibria.
First, recall from the text the necessary conditions associated with the optimality of firms’
prescribed equilibrium strategies:
pg + θg = 2θm, (4)
2θm + 2S = θˆ + pg + S, (5)
θˆg = (pg + S) ∧ 1. (6)
Second, there are feasibility conditions on the endogenous variables (θg, θm, µg, θˆ). One of
these conditions is that every price offered to firms in equilibrium must be sufficiently high to
fund the cost of investment I. By Theorem 3, we have
pg2 = θg < pm = θm < pg. (18)
Thus, we must have
θg ≥ I. (19)
Furthermore, by definition of θg, θm, and µg, we must have
µgθg + µmθm = E[θ|θ ≤ θˆ], (20)
which is same as (3) in the text. Lastly, feasibility requires that θg cannot be too low:
specifically, we must have
θg ≥ E[θ|θ ≤ F−1(µgF (θˆ))]. (21)
Lastly, there are two other necessary conditions. First, buyers in t = 2 should not have
an incentive to offer a p′ 6= pg2 = θg to the firms that received a bailout in t = 1. If a t = 2
buyer offers a p′ > θg to the bailout recipients, all bailout recipients with types θ ≤ θˆ and
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types θ ∈ (θˆ, (p′+S)∧ θˆg] will sell at p′. By (6), no buyer will want to offer p′ > pg, so we can
focus on p′ ≤ pg. Since a fraction µg of firms with types θ ≤ θˆ receives a bailout in t = 1 and
since their average value is θg, for such a deviating offer to be unprofitable, we must have
µgF (θˆ)θg +
∫ p′+S
θˆ
θf(θ)dθ
µgF (θˆ) + (F (p′ + S)− F (θˆ))
− p′ < 0 ∀p′ ∈ (θg, pg]. (22)
Next, buyers in t = 2 should not have an incentive to offer a p′ 6= pm to the firms that did not
sell to the government in t = 1. For instance, if a buyer offers p′ > pg in t = 2, the firms that
refused the bailout with types θ ≤ θˆ and the additional firms with types θ ∈ (θˆg, (p′ + S) ∧ 1]
will sell their assets to the deviator. Again, since a fraction 1 − µg of the firms with types
θ ≤ θˆ refused the bailout and their average value is θm, the necessary condition for such a p′
not to be profitable is
(1− µg)F (θˆ)θm +
∫ p′+S
θˆg
θf(θ)dθ
(1− µg)F (θˆ) + (F (p′ + S)− F (θˆg))
− p′ < 0 ∀p′ ∈ (pg, 1− S]. (23)
The following proposition states that the necessary conditions listed above are indeed
sufficient for the existence of the short-lived stimulation equilibrium.
Proposition 1. For a pg > p0, there exists a short-lived stimulation equilibrium if there exist
(µg, θg, θm, θˆ) that satisfy (19) – (23) and (4) – (6).
Proof. We throughout focus on the case θˆg < 1: the proof for the other case θˆg = 1 is very
similar.
We first show that it is optimal for every type-θ firm to play the prescribed equilibrium
strategies over two periods. Consider t = 2 first. After accepting a bailout, firms with types
θ ≤ θˆ find it optimal to sell to the market at pg2 = θg since θ ≤ θˆ = θg +S from (6). The same
condition implies that it is optimal for the firms with types θ ∈ (θˆ, θˆg] (after accepting the
bailout in t = 1) not to sell at pg2. Consider now the firms with types θ ≤ θˆ that sold to the
market in t = 1. It is optimal for these firms to sell at pm = θm since θ ≤ θˆ = θg +S < θm +S
by Theorem 3-(i). Theorem 3-(i) also implies θm + S < pg + S = θˆg < θ, so it is optimal for
the firms with types θ > θˆg not to sell at pm.
Consider t = 1 next. From (4) and (5), firms with types θ ≤ θˆ are indifferent between
selling to the government in t = 1 and selling to the market in t = 1. Furthermore, (5)
implies θ + pg + S ≤ 2pm + 2S = pg + pg2 + 2S for all θ ≤ θˆ, so it is optimal for all firms
with types θ ≤ θˆ to play the prescribed equilibrium strategy. The same condition also implies
pg + S + θ > 2pm + 2S for all θ > θˆ. Moreover, (6) implies 2θ > pg + S + θ if and only if
θ > θˆg. Hence, it is optimal for a type-θ firm to sell to the government in t = 1 if θ ∈ (θˆ, θˆg]
and for a type-θ firm not to sell in t = 1 if θ > θˆg.
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We next show that it is optimal for every buyer in t = 1, 2 to play the prescribed equilibrium
strategy, given all the other buyers play the same strategy. Note from the zero-profit condition
that every equilibrium price will break even for buyers on the equilibrium path.
Consider buyers in t = 2 who make offers to the bailout recipients. Since all the other
buyers offer pg2 = θg, any offer p
′ < pg2 will be rejected and thus will not be profitable. Suppose
a t = 2 buyer offers p′ > θg. This offer will attract all of the bailout recipients with types
θ ≤ θˆ and those with types θ ∈ (θˆ, (p′ + S)∧ 1]. Thus, the deviating buyer will get the payoff
µgF (θˆ)θg +
∫ (p′+S)∧1
θˆ
θf(θ)dθ
µgF (θˆ) + (F ((p′ + S) ∧ 1)− F (θˆ))
− p′.
However, the payoff above is negative by (22), and therefore, no p′ > θg is profitable. There-
fore, it is optimal for a t = 2 buyer to offer pg2 = θg to the bailout recipients.
Consider next buyers in t = 2 who make offers to the firms that did not accept a bailout
offer. By the same logic as above, one can easily find that it is not optimal for any buyer to
offer p′ < pm = θm. Furthermore, it is not optimal for any buyer to offer p′ ∈ (θm, pg] since
such an offer will attract the sellers to the t=1 market, whose average value is θm, so the buyer
will earn θm − p′ < 0. Lastly, suppose a t = 2 buyer offers p′ > pg. Such an offer will attract
all firms that sold to the market in t = 1 plus all types θ ∈ (θˆg, (p′ + S) ∧ 1]. The resulting
deviation payoff is
(1− µg)F (θˆ)θm +
∫ (p′+S)∧1
θˆg
θf(θ)dθ
(1− µg)F (θˆ) + (F ((p′ + S) ∧ 1)− F (θˆg))
− p′.
By (23), however, the above payoff is negative, which implies such a deviation price p′ > pg is
unprofitable. Hence, it is optimal for every t = 2 buyer to offer pm = θm to the firms refusing
the bailout.
Lastly, consider buyers in t = 1. We shall prove that it is optimal for a buyer of t = 1 to
offer pm. To this end, we first establish a property on θm.
Lemma 4. θm ≥ p0 in any short-lived stimulation equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that θm < p0 = E[θ|θ ≤ θ0]. Since θg < θm by Theorem 3,
we observe θg < p0. Now, suppose a t = 2 buyer deviates and offers p0 to the firms that
accepted a bailout. These firms comprise a fraction µg of firms with θ ≤ θˆ (whose average
is θg) and all firms with θ ∈ (θˆ, θˆg]. All of the former firms will sell to the deviator, and
among the latter, all firms with θ ∈ (θˆ, θ0] are now willing to sell to the deviator at p0. (Recall
θˆg = pg + S > p0 + S = θ0.) Thus the deviating buyer will get the payoff
µgF (θˆ)θg +
∫ θ0
θˆ
θf(θ)dθ
µgF (θˆ) + F (θ0)− F (θˆ)
− p0.
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Since µgθg + (1− µg)θm = E[θ|θ ≤ θˆ] by (20) and θg < θm, however, we have
µgF (θˆ)θg +
∫ θ0
θˆ
θf(θ)dθ
µgF (θˆ) + F (θ0)− F (θˆ)
=
F (θ0)E[θ|θ ≤ θ0]− (1− µg)F (θˆ)θm
F (θ0)− (1− µg)F (θˆ)
> E[θ|θ ≤ θ0] = p0.
This implies the deviation will be profitable, a contradiction. Q.E.D.
We now show that it is optimal for every t = 1 buyer to offer pm. Since buyers in t = 2 will
offer pm to every firm refusing the bailout, any offer p
′ < pm = θm is not attractive to any firm.
Suppose a buyer offers p′ > θm. Since p′ + pm + 2S > 2pm + 2S = pg + p
g
2 + 2S = θˆ + pg + S,
all firms with type θ ≤ p′ + S − (pg − θm) will sell at p′. This implies the deviating buyer will
get the payoff E[θ|θ ≤ p′ + S − (pg − θm)] − p′. Since p′ > pm = θm ≥ p0 by Lemma 4 and
pg > θm by Theorem 3, however, we have
E[θ|θ ≤ p′ + S − (pg − θm)]− p′ < E[θ|θ ≤ p′ + S]− p′ < 0,
where the strict inequality follows from definition of θ0. This implies any offer p
′ > pm is not
profitable. Q.E.D.
C.2 Delayed Stimulation Equilibrium
In a delayed stimulation equilibrium, firms with types θ ≤ θˆ sell in both periods: a fraction
µg of these firms sell to the government at pg in t = 1 and to the market at p
g
2 in t = 2 and the
rest of them sell to the market at pm in t = 1 and p
m
2 in t = 2. Meanwhile, types θ ∈ (θˆ, θˆg] sell
to the government at pg in t = 1 but withdraw from the t = 2 market, and types θ ∈ (θˆg, θ2]
sell at pm2 only in t = 2; types θ > θ2 do not sell in any period. Recall from Theorem 4 that
θˆ = θ0, p
g
2 = θg = pm = θm = p0 = E[θ|θ ≤ θ0], and pm2 = pg in any delayed-stimulation
equilibrium.
Throughout, we focus on delayed stimulation equilibria in which 0 < µg < 1 and θˆ < θˆg—
one can easily establish an equilibrium without this property by applying the same logic. Like
we did in Section C.1, we first list all necessary conditions for a delayed stimulation equilibrium.
First, like in the short-lived stimulation equilibrium, there are conditions associated with the
optimality of firms’ prescribed equilibrium strategies as listed below:
pg + p
g
2 = pm + p
m
2 , (24)
pm + p
m
2 + 2S = θˆ + pg + S, (25)
θ2 = (p
m
2 + S) ∧ 1. (26)
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By applying pg2 = pm = p0 to the conditions above, we have
pg = p
m
2 , (27)
θˆ = p0 + S = θ0, (28)
θ2 = (pg + S) ∧ 1. (29)
Second, buyers must find it optimal to offer the equilibrium price on the equilibrium path
over two periods. First of all, buyers in t = 2 should obtain the highest payoff from offering
p0 to the firms that received a bailout in t = 1. Specifically, the t = 2 buyers must not have
an incentive to offer p′ > p0 to the bailout recipients. By definition of θ0, such a p′ will attract
the bailout recipients with types θ ≤ θ0 and θ ∈ (θ0, p′ + S]. Since the fraction µg of firms
with types θ ≤ θ0 receive a bailout in t = 1 and their average value is θg = E[θ|θ ≤ θ0], the
following condition must hold for p′ to be unprofitable:
µgF (θ0)E[θ|θ ≤ θ0] +
∫ p′+S
θ0
θf(θ)dθ
µgF (θ0) + (F (p′ + S)− F (θ0)) − p
′ < 0 ∀p′ ∈ (p0, pg]. (30)
Moreover, buyers in t = 2 must get the highest payoff from offering p0 to the firms that refused
a bailout offer in t = 1. As before, this means that a t = 2 buyer must not have an incentive
to offer p′ > pm2 = pg to these bailout holdouts. Since the fraction 1− µg of firms with types
θ ≤ θ0 do not receive the bailout in t = 1 and their average value is E[θ|θ ≤ θ0], we must have
the following condition:
(1− µg)F (θ0)E[θ|θ ≤ θ0] +
∫ p′+S
θˆg
θf(θ)dθ
(1− µg)F (θˆ) + (F (p′ + S)− F (θ0))
− p′ < 0 ∀p′ > pg. (31)
Indeed, the following observation reveals that the above necessary conditions—as well as the
properties of Theorem 4—are sufficient for the existence of the delayed stimulation equilibrium.
Proposition 2. For a pg > p0, there exists a delayed stimulation equilibrium if there exist
µg ∈ (0, 1] and θˆg ∈ [θ0, pg + S) that satisfy (24) – (31).
Proof. Just as we did in the proof of Proposition 1, we focus on the case θ2 < 1; the proof for
the case θ2 = 1 is very similar.
We first prove that it is optimal for every type-θ firm to play the prescribed equilibrium
strategies over two periods. Consider t = 2 first. By definition of θ0 and p0, one can easily
show that after receiving the bailout in t = 1, firms with types θ ≤ θ0 would sell whereas
firms with types θ ∈ (θ0, θˆg] would refuse to do so in t = 2. Furthermore, since θ2 = pg + S
by Theorem 4, it is optimal for every firm with type θ ≤ θ2 to sell at pm2 = pg in t = 2 after
refusing the bailout in t = 1. Lastly, since θ2 = pg +S and p
m
2 = pg, it is optimal for the firms
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with types θ > θ2 not to sell at p
m
2 in t = 2.
Consider t = 1 next. Since pg + p
g
2 = pm + p
m
2 from (27), firms with types θ ≤ θ0 are
indifferent between selling to the government and selling to the market in t = 1. Furthermore,
since θ + pg + S ≤ pg + p0 + 2S for all θ ≤ θ0 from (28), it is optimal for the firms with
types θ ≤ θ0 to sell in t = 1. The same condition (28) also implies pg + p0 + 2S < θ + pg + S
for all θ > θ0, so firms with types θ > θ0 do not prefer selling in t = 1. Furthermore, since
pm2 = pg > p0, firms with types θ ∈ (θ0, θ2] are indifferent between accepting the bailout in
t = 1 (but boycotting the market in t = 2) and not selling in t = 1 (but selling in t = 2).
Moreover, since θ2 = pg + S, it is optimal for the firms with types θ ∈ (θ0, θˆg] to sell to the
government in t = 1 and for the firms with types θ > θˆg not to sell in t = 1.
Next, we prove that it is optimal for buyers to offer the stated equilibrium prices in each
period. First, consider the offers made to the firms that received a bailout in t = 1. In t = 1,
a fraction µg of firms with types θ ≤ θ0 and all firms with types θ ∈ (θ0, θˆg] receive the bailout.
Since any offer p′ < pg2 = p0 is unattractive to these firms, no t = 2 buyer will deviate and
offer p′ < p0. Suppose a t = 2 buyer offers p′ > p0. Such an offer will attract the bailout
recipients with types θ ≤ θ0 and θ ∈ (θ0, p′ + S]. Since the average value of firms with types
θ ≤ θ0 that sell to the government is θg = E[θ|θ ≤ θ0], the deviating buyer will get the payoff
µgF (θ0)E[θ|θ ≤ θ0] +
∫ p′+S
θ0
θf(θ)dθ
µgF (θ0) + (F (p′ + S)− F (θ0)) − p
′.
However, such an offer p′ is not profitable by (30): if p′ ∈ (p0, pg], the payoff from offering p′
is negative; the payoff is strictly negative for all p′ > pg.
Consider next offers made to the firms that refused a bailout in t = 1. In t = 1, a fraction
(1 − µg) of firms with types θ ≤ θ0 refuse the bailout. Furthermore, the firms with higher
types θ > θˆg refuse the bailout in t = 1. Since any offer p
′ < p0 is unattractive to the firms
refusing the bailout in t = 1, no t = 2 buyer will offer such a p′. Suppose a t = 2 buyer
deviates and offers p′ > p0. If p′ ≤ θˆg − S, only the firms with types θ ≤ θ0 will sell at p′,
making p′ unprofitable since θm − p′ = E[θ|θ ≤ θ0] − p′ < 0. If p′ > θˆg − S], the firms that
sold to the market in t = 1 and the holdout firms with types θ ∈ (θˆg, (p′ + S) ∧ 1] sell to the
deviating buyer. Since a fraction (1 − µg) of firms with types θ ≤ θ0 sell to the market in
t = 1 and their average value is E[θ|θ ≤ θ0], the deviating buyer will get the payoff
(1− µg)F (θ0)E[θ|θ ≤ θ0] +
∫ (p′+S)∧1
θˆg
θf(θ)dθ
(1− µg)F (θˆ) + (F ((p′ + S) ∧ 1)− F (θ0))
− p′.
However, the above payoff is negative by (31).
Lastly, consider buyers in t = 1. If a buyer offers p′ 6= p0 and a type-θ firm sells at that
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price, this firm will receive the price offer pm2 = pg from buyers in t = 2: recall the t = 2 buyers
can only observe whether or not firms receive the bailout. Since p′+pg +2S < p0 +pg +2S for
any p′ < p0, any offer p′ < p0 is unattractive to any type-θ firm, and thus no buyer in t = 1
has an incentive to offer such a price. Suppose a buyer in t = 1 deviates and offers p′ > p0.
Since p′+ pg + 2S > p0 + pg + 2S, all firms with types θ ≤ θ0 will also sell at p′. Furthermore,
since p′ + pg + 2S > θ0 + pg + S, firms with types θ ∈ (θ0, (p′ + S) ∧ 1] will also sell at p′.
This implies the deviating buyer will get the payoff E[θ|θ ≤ (p′ + S) ∧ 1] − p′. However, by
definition of θ0 and p0, we have E[θ|θ ≤ (p′ + S) ∧ 1] − p′ < 0 for all p′ > p0, which implies
any offer p′ > p0 is unprofitable. Q.E.D.
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